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ABSTRACT 
What explains the resilience and expansion of Jihadism since 9/11? Two primary 
factors associated with its accelerated growth are poor governance in the Muslim world 
and U.S. foreign policy failures. The social and political conditions within Muslim-
majority governments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the role 
of U.S. policy under such conditions may have accelerated the growth of Jihadism 
despite the concerted military, intelligence, and allied efforts to defeat this movement and 
its underlying ideology. The domestic determinants, as represented by the World Bank’s 
governance indicators, were observed within five MENA countries, and their 
performance on those indicators was compared to the levels of violence associated with 
each of the countries both domestically and abroad. To better understand anti-American 
sentiment from U.S. foreign policy failures that have contributed to the growth and 
resilience of violent Jihadi movements, this thesis also observed U.S. foreign policy 
interactions within a MENA region landscape littered with non-representative and poor 
governance. The U.S. government may need to reassess its approach toward violent 
extremists and develop a nuanced and sustainable approach against Islamic 
fundamentalism.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Why has violent Islamic extremism grown in scale since 9/11? What explains the 
resiliency of violent Islamism despite the concerted effort by the U.S. and its allies to 
contain and defeat Islamic militancy? A recent study estimated a 270% increase in violent 
Jihadism advocates between 2001 and 2018, currently “numbering between 100,000 and 
230,000.”1  In the years leading to 2018, there were at least 67 extremist Islamist “groups 
worldwide, a 180% increase from 2001.”2 The civil war in Syria attracted as many as 
40,000 foreign fighters from 86 countries.3  
This thesis explores the resilience and expansion of Jihadism since 9/11 from two 
different angles. First, it will explore the domestic determinants within Muslim-majority 
governments that may have contributed to the growth and resiliency of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Second, it will investigate the role of U.S. policy in widening the support 
base that facilitates accelerating its growth. This thesis will help the U.S. government 
reassess its approach toward violent extremists and help consolidate the victory against 
Islamic fundamentalism. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since 9/11, the U.S. Government has committed “$6.4 trillion on counterterrorism 
efforts through the end of 2020.”4 That money is split with approximately $5.4 trillion 
operational funds and approximately $1 trillion allocated for the care of war veterans 
“through the next several decades.”5 At the current rate total military spending is 
 
1 Seth G. Jones et al., The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat: Current and Future Challenges from the 
Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and Other Groups (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2018), 7–11. 
2 Jones et al., 7–11. 
3 Jones et al., 7–11. 
4 Jill Kimball, Brown University: The Cost of the Global War on Terror: $6.4 Trillion and 801,000 Lives - 
ProQuest, 2019, ProQuest. 
5 Kimball. 
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approximately two thirds of Federal discretionary spending. By 2023 that figure is likely 
to exceed 75% of total discretionary spending.6  
Besides the fiscal implications of the post 9/11 wars the larger cost is in human 
lives lost and in the human suffering endured. Based on a recent report released by the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) on the casualty status from five named operations, total 
U.S. service men and women deaths was approximately 7,048 with an additional 53,241 
wounded.7 Another report on the cost of war by the Watson Institute published in 
November of 2018 provides a tally of over 1 million war-related deaths since 9/11.8 These 
numbers include both U.S. military, U.S. DOD civilians and contractors, allied troops, 
partner nation military and police force, humanitarian/Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO) workers, Journalists, Civilians, and Opposition Fighters. Finally, the 1 million 
deaths “include the more than 500,000 deaths from the war” raging in Syria since 2011.9 
By looking at these numbers, it becomes evident that U.S. efforts to curb violent 
Jihadi activity is simply not working. Continuing to expend the same resources, using the 
same methods does not make any sense, when all we see is an expansion rather than a 
contraction of the militancy problem we sought out to address. Historically, radical social 
movements go through three phases: emergence, growth, and decline through a 
combination of repression and political institutionalization. In the case of the violent 
Islamist movement, however, it continues to grow despite our concerted effort to contain 
it. By exploring the sources of militant resiliency, we can begin concentrating our resources 
where there is an impact and a higher probability of mission success. 
 
6 “Trump Budget Request Takes Military Share of Spending to Historic Levels,” National Priorities 
Project, accessed June 2, 2020, https://www.nationalpriorities.org/analysis/2018/trump-budget-request-
takes-military-share-spending-historic-levels/. 
7 “Immediate Release: Casualty Status,” U.S. Department of Defense, June 1, 2020, 
https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf. 
8 Neta C Crawford, “Human Cost of the Post-9/11 Wars: Lethality and the Need for Transparency,” 
Watson Institute, November 2018, 1, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/
Human%20Costs%2C%20Nov%208%202018%20CoW.pdf. 
9 Crawford, 1. 
3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Islamist resilience can be attributed to a number of factors, including identity and 
religion, social and economic grievances, and the role of political enfranchisement. It can 
also be explained by the strategic opportunism of Islamist militants or the failure of the 
U.S. to undertake the right mix of counterterrorism strategies. This section will explore 
some of these approaches to better understand the institutional, structural, and strategic 
factors that contribute to the persistence of violent Islamic extremist movements. 
1. Political Exclusion 
In his book Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr focuses on relative deprivation as one of the 
primary reasons for militancy.10 Relative deprivation refers to a group’s perception of how 
it is treated compared to other groups. According to Gurr, “Government-imposed 
inequalities are a major source of grievances, repressive policies increase anger and 
resistance, denial of the right to use conventional politics and protest pushes activists 
underground and spawns terrorist and revolutionary resistance.”11 Gurr emphasizes that 
“legitimate governments are seldom targets of rebellion,”12 and highlights the pivotal role 
played by governments in either exacerbating or pacifying unrest. Similarly, Anne Marie 
Baylouny asserts that “local political inclusion can stimulate moderation, stemming the 
progression of militant Islamism in its infancy.”13  
In his book Why Muslim’s Rebel, Mohammed Hafez explains the shift from 
peaceful opposition to violent resistance that Islamist movements underwent in response 
to the repressive political measures instituted by dictatorships concerned about their 
diminishing power. Hafez asserts that it is the structural challenges Islamists faced in 
Algeria and Egypt that denied political inclusion and left Islamists with nothing to lose in 
 
10 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 40th anniversary ed. kindle edition (Boulder, Colo: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2010), loc 103. 
11 Gurr, loc 178. 
12 Gurr, loc 178. 
13 Anne Marie Baylouny, “Emotions, Poverty, or Politics? Misconceptions about Islamist Movements,” 
Connections: The Quarterly Journal 03, no. 1 (2004): 41, https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.03.1.04. 
4 
turning to violence.14 According to Hafez, Islamist movements that resort to violence 
perceive institutional channels for conflict resolution as inaccessible and therefore justify 
violent action as the only viable option to pursue political objectives.  
• Hypothesis 1: The persistence of Islamist militancy is related to the lack of 
democratic governance in the Muslim world.  
2. Failed U.S. Foreign Policy  
There is a vast body of academic literature that ties U.S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East to the rise of the violent Islamist organizations. Those Violent Extremist 
Organizations (VEOs) have plagued the region since 9/11, increasing in popularity and 
widening their support base with no sign of easing anytime soon. Perceptions of U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East may contribute to the resiliency of violent Islamic 
extremism. Polling data presented from post-9/11 surveys carried out by Gallop and Pew 
shows that there was “a pervasive overall attitude of ‘anti-American sentiment’ throughout 
the Muslim world and in the Middle East in particular.”15 This is largely due to perceptions 
of how the U.S. government implemented its counterterrorism policies internationally. 
According to Gregg, there is an overwhelming consensus, among Arabs and Muslims, that 
the “U.S. reaction to 9/11 [went] beyond counterterrorism to a broad hostility to Islam and 
Arabs.”16 This consensus among Muslims, in the countries surveyed, is believed to have a 
major catalyzing effect on the anti-American sentiment which in turn contributed to fueling 
radical ideologues.  
In his book The Five Front War: The Better way to Fight Global Jihad, Daniel 
Byman proposes a five-pronged model for policy makers to consider in the fight against 
violent extremists: 1) Military, 2) War of ideas, 3) Intelligence, 4) Homeland Defense, and 
 
14 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004), 1. 
15 Heather S. Gregg, “Crafting a Better U.S. Grand Strategy in the Post-September 11 World: Lessons 
from the Early Years of the Cold War,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 248, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00110.x. 
16 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism’: A Fundamentally Different Strategy,” 
Middle East Policy 13, no. 3 (2006): 102. 
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5) Democratic Reform.17 Byman acknowledges the resilience and persistence of the 
violent extremist ideology propagated by Islamists and proposes an urgent comprehensive 
effort to address it.  
Like Byman, Abdelslam Maghraoui, in his article “American Foreign Policy and 
Islamic Renewal,” cautions on democratization initiatives undertaken by U.S. policy 
makers.18 They both provide examples and projections on how good policy intentions can 
fail to meet intended objectives if pursued under the wrong conditions. Instead, Maghraoui 
advocates for policies that encourage and support an “Islamic renewal” that empowers 
moderate Islamists and paves the road for much needed political reforms allowing for 
balanced and reasoned political discourse.19  
Maghraoui makes a clear distinction between moderate and extreme Islamists and 
warns against policies that promote an “anti-terrorism strategy [that] conflates various 
Islamist groups into a monolithic threat, regardless of political, ideological, or strategic 
motivations.”20 Additionally, Maghraoui is likely to be skeptical of the military policy 
approach proposed in Byman’s book The Five Front War. Where Byman proposes working 
with local security partners to accomplish military objectives,21 Maghraoui warns that such 
cooperation with “security services that form the backbone of authoritarian regimes in 
Muslim countries … undermines both democratic ambitions and the effort to change 
negative attitudes about the United States in the Muslim world.”22  
Byman offers some constructive criticism of the U.S. policy approach spanning the 
five fronts he identified in his book on The Five Front War. On intelligence, Byman warns 
about unilateral approaches that over exerts our resources with minimal return on 
 
17 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2008), 3–4. 
18 Byman, 168–70; Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, “American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal,” 
Connections: The Quarterly Journal 05, no. 4 (2006): 1, https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.05.4.02. 
19 Maghraoui, “American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal,” 1–2. 
20 Maghraoui, 4. 
21 Byman, The Five Front War, 3. 
22 Maghraoui, “American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal,” 4. 
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investment. He advocates for partnerships that share the burden and significantly improve 
our local intelligence collection capabilities.23 He also criticizes military use of force 
asserting that “we cannot condemn terrorists for taking innocent lives, and then kill 
innocents with our counterterrorism operations.”24 He further adds that “when innocents 
die, the United States looks both incompetent and brutal, a perception that increases support 
for terrorists.”25 
Byman warns about defending the home front without over-reacting with policies 
that promote a “false sense of insecurity.”26 According to Byman, when “deluged by 
nightmarish possibilities, we may miss the real threats and the real dangers.”27 Byman also 
highlights democratization policy shortfalls, where a premature push for democratization, 
without the institutional capacity to manage the transformational process, and the 
prevalence of anti-American sentiment could result in unwanted outcomes.28 Finally, on 
the war of ideas, Byman emphasizes that the information war cannot be disjointed from 
policy, nor cannot it be a unilateral effort, if it is going to be effective.29  
• Hypothesis 2: Failed U.S. Foreign Policy strategies contributed to the 
resiliency of militant Islamism.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
When trying to understand the rise of militant Islamist organizations there is no one 
factor that offers a convincing justification. This thesis will explore the rise and resiliency 
of Violent Islamist Groups by approaching the problem from three different dimensions. 
The first dimension will focus on the structural conditions within the governments in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The Second will explore potential U.S. 
 
23 Byman, The Five Front War, 111–12. 
24 Byman, 123. 
25 Byman, 123. 
26 Byman, 132. 
27 Byman, 132. 
28 Byman, 166–70. 
29 Byman, 180–81. 
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policy contributions, within the MENA region, to the rise and resilience of VIGs, and 
finally the conclusion will evaluate both factors and offer recommendations to curb the 
growth and resilience of VIGs.  
This thesis set out to understand the underlying causes for the resilience and growth 
of Violent Islamism and Jihadi movements throughout the MENA region. Two factors 
where explored with great detail: One focused on understanding the role played by poor 
governance in facilitating the rise of Islamist militancy, and the other focused on the role 
played by U.S. foreign policy within the MENA region that may have contributed to the 
rise and resilience of Islamist militancy.  
The research in Chapter II focused on how poor governance and the lack of political 
exclusion contributed to the rise and resilience of militant Islamism. The Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) provided the levels of violence within a country whereas a report by the 
Soufan Group provided the number of exported terrorists. Those two data sets were then 
combined for an accurate assessment of the levels of militant behavior displayed. The level 
of militancy was then compared to the quality of government provided by six governance 
indicators, provided by the World Bank, to test the causal relationship between the two. 
Though the initial sample size consisted of five MENA countries, the three with the 
largest data variances were selected. Those three included Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco. 
Tunisia and Egypt both exuded high levels of militancy with the highest levels of exported 
terrorists and domestic terrorist incidents respectively. Unlike the other two, Morocco 
showed lower militancy levels while performing relatively poor on all but one governance 
indicatory. This was counterintuitive at first, and though Morocco was second to last 
overall, in its performance on the World Bank Governance Indicators, it outperformed all 
countries observed on the Voice and Accountability metric, re-enforcing that political 
exclusion could in fact play a major role in the rise and resilience of militant Islamism.  
Once the causal relationship between political exclusion and violent militancy was 
established, Chapter III turned to U.S. foreign policy interactions in the MENA region and 
their potential contribution to the durability of violent Islamist movements. Chapter III 
starts with the history of Islamists and their transition from active social movements to 
8 
violent Jihadi movement. It provided the background and historical context for the rise of 
political Islam and the social and political conditions attributed to the ideological doctrine 
used by many Jihadi splinters today. The background section also provided a brief history 
of early interactions between political Islam and U.S. policy makers, going back to the 
Cold War and the Soviet-Afghan War, when it was U.S. policy to arm, train, and fund the 
first global Jihadi movement in an attempt to combat Soviet expansion and influence. 
Once the relationship and ties between militant Islam and U.S. policy makers was 
made, Chapter III turned to understanding anti-American sentiment and the perceived U.S. 
foreign policy contribution to it. Anti-American sentiment was established by an 
overwhelming unfavorable attitude toward the United States from within the MENA region 
expressed in both the Pew and Zogby Research polls. Regional grievances, stemming from 
past U.S. foreign policy, believed to be exacerbating the anti-American sentiment today 
were introduced to define the operating space U.S. policy makers attempt to navigate today. 
This space defined by unpopular foreign policy and an overwhelming anti-American 
sentiment, is where U.S. foreign policy practitioners attempt to implement the National 
Security Strategy and the pursue both diplomatic and military objectives.  
9 
II. POLITICAL EXCLUSION 
A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
According to the Global Terrorism Data Base (GTD) there was a steady increase 
in terrorism incidents throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
after 2001. From 2004 -2012, terrorist incidents made a noticeable increase and from 
2012–2014 terrorist incidents more than tripled from approximately 2000 incidents per 
year to over 7000 incidents.30  Though the dramatic increase is likely associated with 
the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, there is still significant activity within domestic 
settings that is worthy of analysis. Looking at both numbers of individuals per capita 
who either tried or succeeded in leaving their home countries to join ISIS, and at 
numbers of domestic terrorism incidents will allow for a more balanced analysis when 
cross referencing the levels of violence between countries with their performance on 
various governance indicators. The expectation is that the level of performance on 
certain governance indicators may directly impact a country’s vulnerability to extremist 
ideology and hence influence militant behavior motivated by that ideology. 
B. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
This chapter will look at the role of poor governance in five majority Muslim 
MENA countries (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco), while focusing 
primarily on three (Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco), to explain the rise in Islamist 
militancy and the violent extremism associated with it. Despite the economic, social, 
and cultural similarities between those three countries the outcome variance makes 
them prime candidates to understanding the role played by certain governance 
indicators that might have led to the varying levels of militancy observed. All five of 
the countries selected offer high levels of displayed militancy, but Tunisia is by far the 
largest per capita exporter of militant Islamists, whereas Egypt has the largest number 
of domestic terrorism incidents, and finally Morocco underperforms on both those 
 
30 “Global Terrorism Data Base,” GTD, accessed September 15, 2020, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
search/Results.aspx?region=10. 
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metrics, displaying lower levels of observed militancy, while outperforming all in the 
opportunities available for its people to participate in governance. 
This chapter will look at domestic terrorism incidents and number of exported 
militants per capita from each country to identify causal factors driving variation 
between countries. The term exported militants includes both those who tried but were 
either stopped at the border from entering Iraq or Syria, and those who successfully 
crossed the border and joined the ISIS ranks. Though the exported militant numbers are 
the primary indicator in this research, the number of terrorist incidents within a 
specified country’s borders also provided additional insight into the rising tide of 
militancy that is increasing the levels of violence. The variation in the observed 
countries’ militant activity will be explored between the years 2012 to 2016, where 
there was a marked increase in terrorist activity and Islamist militancy across the 
MENA region. The variation in militancy levels will then be cross-referenced with each 
country’s performance on selected governance indicators to uncover a causation 
between an individual country’s performance on those indicators and the uptick in 
violence in the years that followed.  
The research in this chapter will rely heavily on the University of Maryland’s 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for terrorist incidents per country and on a report by 
the Soufan Group on the national origin and number of foreign fighters that trekked 
from their country of origin to fight in the ISIS ranks. Both the number of incidents and 
a country’s human capital contribution to ISIS on a per capita basis will be observed 
and the degree of variation between countries will be identified. The variances over 
time observed in both these metrics will be assessed with a primary focus on the 
numbers of foreign fighters exported by each of the five countries studied. The GTD 
numbers will also be used, but only when there is a significant variance in the number 
of Islamist motivated terrorist incidents within the 2012 to 2016 timeframe, as in the 
case of Egypt. 
Good or bad governance in this paper will be defined by a country’s 
performance on six governance indicators provided by the World Bank: Control of 
Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and the Absence of Violence, 
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Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability. The data collected 
from both sources will be compared to the six governance indicators to see if there is a 
correlation between a country’s performance, as measured by those indicators, and their 
populations’ propensity to participate in Jihadi Islamist militancy within and outside 
their borders. Those states’ performance on governance indicators will then be 
scrutinized for a nuanced understanding of how each country’s performance on certain 
indicators could in fact impact its vulnerability to violent extremist ideology fueling 
Islamist militancy. 
The five MENA countries considered in this research were selected based on 
meeting one or more of the following three criteria. First is their contribution to the 
ISIS foreign fighter pool, second is the large number of terrorist incidents within their 
recognized borders, and third is their status as non-rentier states with one exception, 
Saudi Arabia. The term “rentier” states refers to governments that are heavily reliant 
on exporting natural resources with less dependence on tax collection and as a result 
are less accountable to their populations.31 The effort to avoid rentier states is mostly 
due to the large number of imported labor (both skilled and unskilled), the small local 
population size, the added dynamic of patronage networks unique to rentier states, or 
simply due to the very small sample size of reported militant Islamists.  
Saudi Arabia has a large local population consisting of approximately two thirds 
of the county’s residents. It also has a large pool of Islamist militancy both within and 
outside its borders. Egypt on the other hand was selected despite its minimal per capita 
contribution to the ISIS foreign fighter pool. Egypt’s selection was based on its 
dramatic uptick in terrorist incidents at home within the same timeframe of ISIS’s 
unprecedented growth. In contrast, other countries like Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, 
had relatively little terrorist activity at home but provided some of the largest numbers 
of ISIS volunteers on a per capita basis.  
Countries like Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, had high 
terrorist activity but were not selected, due to their status as failed or failing states. 
 
31 Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 327–28. 
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Failed and failing states are outside of the intended scope of this research. Countries 
like Algeria, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman were not selected because of 
their status as rentier states. Some of those countries have local populations consisting 
of less than 25% of their residents and robust welfare systems that mitigate social 
challenges experienced elsewhere. Additionally, all mentioned states had relatively 
minimal terrorist activity within the timeframe in question. 
The inclusion of Jordan and Saudi Arabia in the presented data and its analysis 
is to highlight the impact of certain governance indicators on a state’s vulnerability to 
violent extremism. However, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are less central to the analysis 
due to the following factors. First of those, which has already been identified, is the 
large number of migrant workers that constitute approximately one third of the work 
force. This might add to domestic dynamics that are out of the scope of this project. 
Saudi’s status as a rentier state and Jordan’s proximity to both Iraq and Syria also add 
certain complexities that are best left out of this project.  
Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco will be the main subjects of this research. They 
represent similar social, cultural, and economic conditions and provide the largest 
variances in both their governance indicator percentile rankings and in their violence 
outputs. While both Tunisia and Egypt present the largest numbers in militant activity, 
with one leading the pack in militant exports and the other in domestic terror incidents, 
they both perform radically different in most governance indicators. Morocco on the 
other side is not a star performer by any means on its governance indicators, outpacing 
only Egypt, but has demonstrated a significantly better ability to contain the resiliency 
and growth of militant Islamism.  
C. DATA ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
Three main sources of data were used for the raw data analyzed in this research. 
Two of these sources, the Global Terrorism Data Base and the Soufan Group, offer 
metrics associated with the domestic affinity to the militant Islamist ideology that fuels 
violent extremism. That domestic affinity, is measured by the amount of terrorist 
incidents happening within a country’s borders and in the number of foreign fighters 
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willing to join the ranks of the Islamic State, and is a direct outcome of a country’s poor 
performance on the six worldwide governance indicators provided by the World Bank. 
The affinity for militant Islamist ideology will be measured by both the number of 
domestic terrorist incidents and the number of foreign fighters exported. The higher the 
number of militant activity, the more likely a larger segment of the population is 
susceptible to the ideology propagated by militant Islamists.  
Reliable data on foreign fighters was not easy to find. There were multiple 
sources reporting on FFs but the lack of consistency in the numbers gave reason to 
doubt the actual number of fighters by national origin. Several news outlets and 
academic literature acknowledged that, in some cases, certain governments admitted to 
inflating their numbers to entice foreign assistance and funding on counter terrorism 
initiatives while in other cases governments had underreported.32 
The Soufan Group report provided some of the most consistent findings and was 
cited by multiple credible academic and media outlets. Those outlets include the BBC 
and the Congressional Research Service.33 Based on the group’s demonstrated 
credibility, this chapter relies heavily on the Soufan Group publication “Beyond the 
Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees” by Richard Barrett, when 
referencing the national origin of Foreign Fighters that joined the ISIS ranks.34  
D. DEFINING GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 
The World Bank, which offers the third source of data, provides percentile 
rankings that will be used to measure the extent to which performance on those 
indicators is associated with a country’s foreign fighter exports or the number of 
 
32 Elena Pokalova, “Driving Factors behind Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 42, no. 9 (September 2, 2019): 804, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1427842; Max 
Friedman, “Why Cutting Foreign Aid Benefits Terrorists,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 9, 2017, 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-cutting-foreign-aid-benefits-terrorists. 
33 Jim Muir, “‘Islamic State’: Raqqa’s Loss Seals Rapid Rise and Fall,” BBC News, October 17, 2017, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35695648; Christopher M Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: 
Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report No. RL33533 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2020), 18, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf. 
34 Richard Barrett, “Beyond The Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees” (Soufan Group, 
October 1, 2017), https://www-jstor-org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/resrep10782. 
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domestic terrorism incidents. A government’s performance on the World-Wide 
Governance Indicators provides the marker for their overall quality of governance. The 
information presented in this research links poor governance, specifically on certain 
governance indicators within the five selected cases studies, to higher levels Islamist 
militancy. 
Per the GTD the highest levels of militant violence within the MENA region are 
concentrated within the five years after the Arab Spring. This is likely due to both the 
political instability provoked by Arab Spring and by the rise of ISIS as it expanded in 
both numbers and territory within both Iraq and Syria. This section will focus on the 
governance indicators during the decade preceding the Arab Spring and highlight the 
trends that may have contributed to increased levels of militancy within the countries 
studied. It will start by defining the indicators followed by providing an assessment of 
how those indicators impacted the poor governance that  
According to Kaufmann et al., the World Governance Indicators were developed 
by the World Bank in 1996 in an attempt to standardize evaluations on “six composite 
indicators of broad dimensions of governance covering over 200 countries.” Those 
indicators include: “Voice and Accountability,” “Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism,” “Government Effectiveness,” “Regulatory Quality,” “Rule of 
Law,” and “Control of Corruption.” These indicators were collected from multiple 
reliable sources through surveys that captured governance perceptions in each of the 
countries presented. The data came from a multitude of international sources that 
encompass commercial, nonprofit, private-and public-sector organizations.35  
Kaufmann et al. start by defining governance as “the traditions and institutions 
by which authority in a country is exercised.”36 This definition is broken up into three 
categories that include: “(a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored 
and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
 
35 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
Methodology and Analytical Issues,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network, September 1, 2010), 4, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1682130. 
36 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 4. 
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sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them.” 37 Each one of those three 
categories are assigned two governance indicators that help with evaluating each 
country’s level of performance within the accepted governance norms of the global 
context.38 
Following are all three categories and their assigned governance indicators 
along with their definitions as expressed by Kaufmann et al. 
(a) The process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced: 
Voice and Accountability (VA)—capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV)—capturing 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically‐
motivated violence and terrorism 
(b) The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies: 
Government Effectiveness (GE)—capturing perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies. 
Regulatory Quality (RQ)—capturing perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
(c) The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them: 
Rule of Law (RL)—capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
Control of Corruption (CC)—capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.39 
 
 
37 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 4. 
38 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 4. 
39 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 4. 
16 
E. DOMESTIC TERRORISM INCIDENTS (GTD) 
Figure 1 provides a better side by side comparison of the five countries observed 
within the timeframe in question, whereas the graphs in Figure 2 were taken directly 
from the GTD website and offer a more comprehensive timeline of violent incident 
spikes. Notice the Y axis in Figures 1 and 2 varies from country to country. 
 










Egypt had a relatively small amount of 
terrorist activity in the years leading to 
the Arab Spring. Terrorist incidents 
started to rise in 2010 but then made a 
drastic climb in the three years after 
the Arab Spring peaking with almost 




Saudi Arabia had kept its terrorist 
activity in check until 2004, when it 
went through a relative spike of 
approximately 20 incidents. Saudi 
would then see re-ignited activity 
around 2011, but would then see a 
drastic spike to over 100 incidents by 
2015 before it tapered off at just over 
120 incidents in 2016. Saudi would 
then see a decline of activity to less 
than a half in 2017, but would then see 





Terrorist incidents in Morocco are 
minuscule when compared to other 
MENA countries. It peaks at 
approximately 6 incidents in 2007 and 
stays in the range of zero to 1 annual 







Jordan peaked in 1991 and then again 
in 2016 with approximately 11 
incidents at each peak. After the peak 
in the 1990s Jordan saw a decline in 
terrorist activities with approximately 
2 incidents per year on average. 
Jordan experienced zero incidents in 
2003, but then had an upsurge in 
terrorist activity with 4 deadly 
incidents in 2005. In 2007 Jordan 
experienced a period of relative calm, 
until 2013 when it saw a marked 
increase in terrorist activity, that 
would peak in 2016. By 2018 terrorist 
activity would decrease again to 
approximately 2 incidents per year. 
Tunisia 
 
Tunisia peaked in 2013 with just under 
30 incidents, they then had a sharp 
decline from 2015–2017, where they 
went from approximately 25 incidents 
to five. In 2018 they saw another spike 
with approximately 20 incidents. 
Figure 2. GTD by Country Analysis41 
Table 1 one provides a comprehensive breakdown of all the data collected from the 
sources used for this thesis chapter. The table offers data in adapted form for added nuance 
and comprehensive analysis. 
 
41 Source: GTD. 
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Table 1. Country Rankings per Governance Indicator Superimposed over 
Foreign Fighters per Capita and a One Year Peak in Domestic Terrorism 
Incidents42  

























Jordan 2 1 1 3 2 1 487 11 
Tunisia 4 3 3 1 1 3 674 29 
KSA 5 2 2 2 4 2 126 126 
Morocco 1 5 4 4 3 4 135 1 
Egypt 3 4 5 5 5 5 8 680 
The values 1 through 5 represent how those countries ranked in relation to each other per each of 
the six governance indicators observed. The countries are lined up with the top performer, based 
on average scores from 2000–2010, on top to worst performer at the bottom. 
 
F. BY COUNTRY GOVERNANCE INDICATOR ANALYSIS  
Figures 3 through 7 offer a visual reference for the analysis that follows. Each line 
on the graph depicts one of the six World Bank governance indicators observed. Every one 
of the five countries is represented by its individual graph for an in-depth look at each 
country’s performance.  
 
42 World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” World Bank, 2019, https://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/Home/Reports; Barrett, “Beyond The Caliphate:  Foreign Fighters and the Threat of 




Figure 3. Egypt, Arab Republic43 
In the decade leading to the Arab Spring Egypt’s lowest score was in the Voice and 
Accountability governance metric. In the five years leading to the Arab Spring, Egypt was 
consistently under the 15th percentile rank on Voice and Accountability and continued 
trending downwards in the years that followed.44 Egypt did not do well on the Political 
Stability and the Absence of Violence indicator. It trended downward reaching its lowest pre-
Arab Spring ranking of 19.43 in 2010.45 Its ranking took a nose dive after the Arab Spring 
which coincided with the uptick in domestic terrorist incidents within the same timeframe. 
The government effectiveness indicator maintained an average percentile rank of 
 
43 Adapted from World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” 
44 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators,” Egypt. 
45 World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” 
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approximately 43 in the decade preceding the Arab Spring. It fluctuated within an eleven-
percentile range, ranking as low as 36.10 in 2006 and as high as 47.37 in 2009. The 
government effectiveness percentile rank would also see a sharp 20-point downward trend in 
the years after the Arab Spring, which were also the years where Egypt recorded the highest 
levels of domestic terror incidents.46 
On the Regulatory Quality indicator, Egypt trended upwards, starting at the percentile 
rank of 35.71 in 2002 and making slow but steady annual progress which capped off just short 
of a 50-percentile rank in 2008. Egypt would maintain a percentile ranking of approximately 
47 for the remaining of the decade observed. The Rule of Law indicator was Egypt’s highest 
performing percentile rank, and the only one to barely exceed an average of 50 in the decade 
that preceded the Arab Spring.47 
On the control of corruption indicator, Egypt attained a 42-percentile ranking in 2002, 
but then trended sharply downward to a 23.79 percentile ranking in 2008. Though the 
government appeared to make an effort the following year to address the problem, which is 
demonstrated by the approximately 13-point improvement in 2009, but then fell 
approximately 6 points to 30.95 in 2010.48 
Egypt consistently under performed in all governance indicators with the lowest 
percentile ranking in all except two, the Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability. Egypt 
barely outperformed Morocco, with a negligible 3-point difference, on the Rule of Law 
(Egypt’s best pre-Arab Spring performance in relation to the other governance indicators). 
Egypt also outperformed both Saudi Arabia and Tunisia in the Voice and accountability 
metric, but was still relatively low with an average percentile ranking of 16.48 in the decade 
preceding the Arab Spring.49 
Egypt consistently performed worse than any other country in this study. Though 
Egypt might not have provided large numbers of foreign fighters to fill the ISIS pool, it had 
 
46 World Bank. 
47 World Bank. 
48 World Bank. 
49 World Bank. 
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the highest number of terrorist incidents, negatively outperforming all other countries in this 
study. This may have been attributed to the steady decline in the control of corruption score 
combined with the consistently low scores in Voice and accountability percentage ranking.  
2. Morocco 
 
Figure 4. Morocco50 
On almost all its governance indicators, Morocco maintained a steady and relatively 
low percentile rank, with some minor fluctuation that was mostly insignificant. Morocco 
comes in at fourth out of the five countries included in this report on three of the six 
governance indicators with Egypt being at the bottom of the group in all three. Those three 
indicators include Political Stability and the Absence of Violence, Control of Corruption, 
 
50 Adapted from World Bank. 
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and Government Effectiveness. Morocco is at the bottom of the group in the Rule of Law 
percentile ranking but surprisingly outperforms the rest on Voice and Accountability. 
Granted, at a 29.04 percentile ranking in Voice and Accountability, there is not much to 
rave about, but apparently Morocco provides valuable threshold scores that provide 
valuable insight. Finally, Morocco comes in at third place in the Government Effectiveness 
percentile rank, barely outperforming Saudi Arabia and outdoing Egypt by approximately 
8 points.51 
3. Saudi Arabia 
 
Figure 5. Saudi Arabia52 
 
51 World Bank. 
52 World Bank. 
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In the decade leading to the Arab Spring Saudi Arabia averaged an approximate 
percentile rank of 55 on the Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, and the Control of Corruption 
governance indicators. On those three indicators Saudi Arabia was second only to Jordan 
within the country grouping selected for this research. It is worth highlighting that Saudi 
Arabia’s performance on the Rule of Law indicator trended upwards in the 7 years 
preceding the Arab Spring, reaching its highest percentile ranking of over 60 in 2010.53  
On the Political Stability and Absence of violence indicator, Saudi Arabia comes 
in second after Tunisia by a large margin of approximately 15 points. Jordan and Morocco 
both follow suite with percentile ranking trailing Saudi Arabia by less than 4 points, while 
Egypt lags approximately 10 points behind. Though the average 10-year percentile rank 
for Saudi Arabia on Government Effectiveness is approximately 49, the average in this 
case does not capture the upward trend that showed a marked improvement that increased 
Saudi’s percentile ranking by approximately 13 points in the years preceding the uptick in 
violence. The score took a small dip after the Arab Spring but quickly recovered and 
continued on an upward trend outperforming all other countries in the group and closing at 
a ranking of over 60 percentile in 2015.54  
Where the Saudis are mostly challenged is with their Voice and Accountability 
score. Their score is so terrible that even Egypt outperformed them in all 15 years observed. 
They maintained a score in the single digits in all but one year, averaging a score below 
five between 2005 and 2015. This information in conjunction with Saudi Arabia’s high 
performance on the Rule of Law metric helps with uncovering a trend that will be explored 
further in this research. 
 
53 World Bank. 




Figure 6. Tunisia55  
Tunisia performed relatively well on most governance indicators in the 10 years 
preceding the Arab Spring. Using the ten-year average percentile ranking (see Table 2) to 
compare how each one of the five countries performed, Tunisia ranked at the top in two 
governance indicators with a percentile ranking of almost 50 in Political Stability and the 
Absence of Violence and just a few points short of 70 in Government Effectiveness. Tunisia 
performed well, coming in at a close third trailing both Jordan and Saudi Arabia in the Rule of 
Law, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption percentile rankings scoring just short of 
55 percentile points in each. Despite its better than average performance on 5 of the 6 
governance indicators, Tunisia would significantly underperform in Voice and Accountability 
placing it at second to last with a ten-year average percentile ranking of 15.03. Tunisia would 
only outperform Saudi Arabia with Egypt outpacing it by approximately 1 point.56 
 
55 World Bank. 
56 World Bank. 
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On Voice and Accountability, Tunisia lagged behind for at least the decade leading to 
the Arab Spring. Its percentile ranking made a dramatic turn to the worse, going down to single 
digits, in 2006. Its lacking performance, on the Voice and Accountability metric, would 
continue until the Arab Spring, but would then make a notable improvement with a percentile 
ranking of over 55 in 2015.57  
5. Jordan 
 
Figure 7. Jordan58 
Jordan did relatively very well in all six metrics leading the pack in three of the 
six. It was a close second in the Voice and Accountability and Government Effectiveness 
rankings, outperformed by slim margins on both. Jordan came in third in Political 
 
57 World Bank. 
58 World Bank. 
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Stability and the Absence of Violence with Saudi Arabia outperforming it by less than 
2 points.59  
Overall, Jordan led the pack with an average 10-year percentile ranking, on all 
six governance indicators, of approximately 51 while Tunisia trailed closely behind with 
a 49-percentile ranking. Saudi Arabia and Morocco came in third and fourth with less 
than .5 point difference (42.7/42.5), and Egypt came in last trailing Morocco by 
approximately 8 points.60 
Table 2 provides yet another angle for viewing the data. The single digit scores 
used for the governance metrics are a shortened version of the percentile scores that are 
simplified for the readers convenience. The four columns on the right provide added 
insight to how acute the problem is by country in relative terms. 



































Jordan 3 6 6 3 6 6 5.00 487 11 3,000 6,154,949 
Tunisia 2 5 5 5 7 5 4.83 674 29 7,531 11,179,149 
KSA 0 6 6 4 5 6 4.50 507 126 10,908 21,531,722 
Morocco 3 5 5 3 5 5 4.33 135 1 4,674 34,663,603 
Egypt 2 5 4 3 4 3 3.50 8 680 750 92,442,547 
*Red font represents an observed downward trend in performance that is not fully captured by the average score
The 0–9 scale is based on rounding average percentile rankings up or down and then assigning a value from 0–9 
based on the following: percentile ranks from 0–9.99 are all assigned a zero value; 10–14.99 are assigned a 1 value; 
15.0-24.99 are assigned a 2 value; 25–35.49 are assigned a 3 value; 35–44.49 are assigned a 4 value; and so on until 
we reach 95–100 with a value of 10. The higher the number the better that country scored in that category. 
59 World Bank. 
60 World Bank. 
61 GTD, “Global Terrorism Database”; Barrett, “Beyond The Caliphate”;  “International Migrant Stock, Total 
- Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Arab Rep., Jordan, Tunisia|Data,” World Bank, 2019, https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL? locations=SA-MA-DZ-EG-JO-TN; “Population, Total - Saudi
Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Arab Rep., Jordan, Tunisia | Data,” World Bank, 2019, https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=SA-MA-DZ-EG-JO-TN; World Bank, “Worldwide
Governance Indicators.”
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Table 2 is provided for a simpler presentation of each country’s percentile ranking as 
obtained by the World Bank and to facilitate an easier visualization of the data collected. There 
are several data points in this diagram that tell a story based on how each country performed 
and how that performance translates to an increase in Islamist militancy. The focus in this 
research is primarily on the variation in the number of foreign fighters per million and in the 
incidents of domestic terror incidents. Though averages provide some insight, it is important 
to note both upward and downward trends detected over the years that are likely to have 
contributed to the frustration that was eventually expressed in the two different forms of 
violence observed.  
The Soufan Group report provides a comprehensive breakdown of ISIS affiliated 
foreign fighters by national origin.62 The report provides several data points to include the 
number of fighters, per state of origin, broken down into fighters that made it to Iraq or Syria, 
those stopped or turned back at the border, and those watch listed by Turkey.63 The sum of 
those three categories is what appears in the total fighters column in Table 2. Next, the total 
local population (minus migrant workers) is used to calculate the foreign fighters per million 
inhabitants for a fair country to country comparison. Jordan and Saudi Arabia had the largest 
ratio of a migrant workers population, with over three and ten million respectively, and 
therefore the number was deducted from their total population, whereas the migrant worker 
numbers in the other three countries were negligible and therefore not deducted.64 
Though Tunisia had been performing well on most indicators, in the first few years of 
the decade observed, and placed at a close second to Jordan, Tunisia unlike Jordan was on a 
downward trajectory on all indicators except for the Rule of Law. On Voice and 
Accountability, it went from just short of a 22-percentile ranking in 2005 to single digits and a 
steady downward trend from 2006 to 2010. With downward trends in Regulatory Quality, 
Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, and Control of Corruption, Tunisia’s 
governance performance was sure to have residual impacts that accentuate a society’s militant 
 
62 Barrett, “Beyond The Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees.” 
63 Barrett, 12. 
64 World Bank, “International Migrant Stock, Total - Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Arab Rep., 
Jordan, Tunisia | Data.” 
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tendencies. Government Effectiveness declined approximately 10 points from a 72-percentile 
ranking, whereas Control of Corruption would trend downwards going from a reasonable 69 
approximate percentile ranking in 2002, to an approximate 49 percentile ranking in 2010, 
outperforming only Egypt in the year before the Arab Spring. When observed from that 
vantage point the discontent becomes evident, especially when the only improving, or upward 
trending, metric was the Rule of Law. Tunisia’s numbers tell a story of a gradual decline in 
government performance, while coercive measures, represented by the Rule of Law metric, 
were on the rise in an environment where self-expression, represented by the Voice and 
Accountability metric, was abysmal.  
Saudi Arabia also presents an interesting data set that is consistent with Tunisia’s 
findings. Though it performs relatively well on all metric, outperforming Tunisia on three of 
the six governance indicators, its terrible performance in Voice and Accountability is an outlier 
that is very hard to miss. With an average ranking in barely the five percentile, it is 
approximately 10 points lower than the next low performer. Granted Voice and Accountability 
is a weak metric in all observed MENA countries, Saudi Arabia takes the prize for being at the 
bottom of the barrel. Meanwhile like Tunisia, Saudi Arabia also saw an upward trend in the 
Rule of Law metric, which inevitably tells a similar story of bolstering the nations coercive 
mechanisms while silencing the right to self-expression. 
Jordan led the pack in most metrics, but still closely trailed Saudi, placing it in third 
place for foreign fighters per million. Jordan came no were close to Saudi’s numbers in 
domestic terrorist incidents. Egypt significantly underperformed in their foreign fighter 
contribution, but clearly compensated for that lack in performance with its exceptionally large 
number of domestic terror incidents. Saudi Arabia comes in second with a more than 550 
incident gap between the two with Egypt at approximately 680 incidents and Saudi Arabia at 
approximately 126.  
Though it is tough to rank the countries individually by their degree of militancy, it is 
evident that Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are all high risk, whereas Jordan and Morocco 
are in a lower risk category, with Morocco being the least risky of the five countries. The 
common theme contributing to a relatively large number of foreign fighters appears to be the 
consistently low scores in the Voice and Accountability metric. The impacts from the lack of 
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a country’s performance on that specific metric are highly pronounced in KSA, Egypt, and 
Tunisia, all offering concerning militancy rates that far exceed both Jordan and Morocco. 
Additionally, though Morocco did not do well across the governance indicators coming in 2nd 
from the bottom, and outperforming only Egypt, it did score the highest, comparatively, on the 
Voice and Accountability metric. 
G. THE ROLE OF VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Figure 8 offers only two governance metrics from the six governance indicators
observed. It highlights the contrast between the performances of each by country. 
Figure 8. Voice and Accountability vs. The Rule of Law65 
Having observed each of the countries in the sample it is evident that one of the most 
consistent drivers of violent action are the low scores in Voice and Accountability. There is a 
consistent negative correlation between the Voice and Accountability percentile ranking and 
the levels of violence in each of the countries presented. The three countries with the highest 
65 World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” 
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rates of militancy, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Egypt, all have five-year averages that were 
under a 15-percentile ranking, with Tunisia and KSA showing a consistent downward trend 
averaging in the single digits in the last five years (2005-2010) observed. Morocco on the other 
hand, though it still needs significant improvement across the board, did relatively well scoring 
significantly better on the Voice and Accountability metric and as a result was better able to 
manage the wave of Islamist militancy that swept through the region.  
The following sections will focus on the interplay between the Voice and 
Accountability governance indicator and the Rule of Law governance indicator. The negative 
correlation between both indicators and the increased levels of violence observed as a result 
will be explained through social theory. The countries with the largest variances in their 
observed militancy, Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt, will be the main subjects for this section. 
The internal dynamics within Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, expressed through the governance 
indicators observed, will be explored through social theory for a better understanding of what 
drove high levels of militancy within those specific populations. Additionally, Morocco’s 
relatively low levels of militancy will be analyzed to shed light on why a country with relatively 
low scores on almost all the World Bank’s governance indicators can do better with containing 
militancy than others with more resources and habitually better percentile rankings on most 
indicators studied. 
1. Voice and Accountability as Foundational Elements for a Functional 
Democracy 
Multiple sources attest to the challenge of defining what constitutes democratic 
governance,66 but one core principle of democratic governance according to Skaaning is 
that “democracy means rule by the people.”67 Skaaning’s emphasis on the “popular control 
over public decision-making and decision- makers, and equality of respect and voice 
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between citizens in the exercise of that control,”68 strongly corroborates the definition of 
the Voice and Accountability governance indicator put forth by the World Bank. Skaaning 
asserts that the “Rule by the people”69 is foundational for a democracy, which is another 
way of saying “citizens are able to participate in selecting their government.”70 
Additionally, “popular control over public decision-making and decision- makers, and 
equality of respect and voice between citizens in the exercise of that control,”71 is in line 
with the “freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.”72 
Out of the six World Bank governance indicators, Voice and Accountability is the 
one indicator that is most clearly associated with democratic governance. Though good 
performance in all six indicators is critical for a well-functioning democracy, the virtues 
that go along with the Voice and Accountability indicator are basically synonymous with 
the virtues that lay the foundation for democratic governance. A country’s perceived 
performance on the Voice and Accountability metric, which is defined by the “extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media,” 73 provides insight into 
the degree of democratic governance in a given state. Voice and Accountability is in 
essence the bedrock that good democracies are built on. You might be able to have some 
Voice and Accountability without a fully developed democracy, but there is no well-
developed functioning democracy that is not a high performer on the Voice and 
Accountability metric. 
Building the positive correlation between the Voice and Accountability governance 
score and a country’s democratic performance is an important baseline to establish since 
most social theory literature references democratic governance. Low Voice and 
Accountability scores in the countries selected is directly correlated with those countries 
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lack of democratic institutions limiting citizen participation in all facets of governance. 
Figures 9 and 10 presenting the Checks on Government and Representative Government 
metrics, pulled from the Global State of Democracy indices, show almost identical trends 
in performance on the Voice and Accountability metrics collected by the World Bank in 
the decade between 2000–2010. This further supports associating performance on Voice 
and Accountability with democracy levels within any given country. 
 
Figure 9. Democratic Governance—Voice Factor74 
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Figure 10. Democratic Governance—Accountability Factor75 
H. APPLYING THEORY TO UNDERSTAND THE ROLE PLAYED BY POOR 
GOVERNANCE IN PROMOTING MILITANCY 
Before applying theory to the cases observed, this section will introduce two major 
themes that apply across the region. One emphasizes social and economic causes, while 
the other stresses the importance of political enfranchisement. This section will focus on 
the impact of governance on the social and political drivers that contributed to the social 
unrest in the three North African countries selected. The rise in Islamist militancy will then 
be explored from within the context of each country’s performance on the Worldwide 
Governance indicators and the civil unrest associated with the lack of democratic 
institutions associated with poor governance. The causal chain linking the lack of 
democratic institutions and poor governance with militant Islamism will be uncovered to 
better understand the institutional and structural conditions contributing to the rise and 
persistence of violent Islamic extremist organizations/movements. 
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Gurr’s book Why Men Rebel sought to understand the factors and conditions that 
contribute to violent rebellion.76 Gurr focuses on relative deprivation as one of the primary 
reasons for rebellion. Relative deprivation refers to a group’s perception of how they are 
treated compared to how they feel they should be treated.77 He examines the role of 
government in people’s lives and how that impacts their perceptions and expectations.  
Gurr’s relative deprivation theory helps with explaining the significant variance in 
militant activity between Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, Morocco 
performed consistently mediocre on all governance indicators in the decade observed. It 
trended mildly upward on some indicators while trending mildly downward on others. 
Morocco’s average score in all governance indicators in the decade before the Arab Spring 
was almost identical to its average score in the five years following the Arab Spring.  
Tunisia and Egypt on the other hand, showed downward trends in most of the 
governance indicators observed between 2000–2010. Egypt maintained a steady score in 
the Rule of Law metric whereas Tunisia made significant strides on that same metric. When 
the Rule of Law metric is the best performing metric (or one of the best), as in Egypt and 
Tunisia, it is safe to deduce that an improvement in that metric alone while leaving other 
metrics behind, is evidence of coup-proofing where a state focuses on bolstering its 
coercive capabilities to secure regime survivability.78  
Per Gurr’s relative deprivation theory, it was the decline in the quality of 
governance which violated the social contract between the government and the governed 
and the lack of democratic institutions, represented by the low Voice and Accountability 
score, that left those populations with no other choice stemming the militancy observed 
within the Tunisian and Egyptian populations.79 Tunisia’s performance on, Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, and Control of Corruption, 
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all showed significant downward trends just before the observed years of increased 
violence. Tunisia’s past performance on Government Effectiveness and Control of 
Corruption metrics, with achieved percentile rankings in the seventies, and sixties 
respectively, followed by the significant decline in those same metrics and others, was not 
left unnoticed by the Tunisian population. Unlike Tunisia, which had scores in some 
governance indicators exceeding the seventy percentile, Egypt consistently performed 
poorly across the broad spectrum of governance indicators and still managed to trend 
further downwards. Egypt recorded a drop in performance, in the critical decade preceding 
the observed violence, in its Control of Corruption, Voice and Accountability, Government 
Effectiveness, and Political Stability metrics.  
Tunisia is a great example of how relative deprivation from government-imposed 
inequalities may have crossed a threshold and led to the violence that followed. Tunisia, 
by far, made the largest per capita foreign fighter contribution to ISIS. Though Saudi 
Arabia out-performed it in the actual numbers of foreign fighter contributions, Tunisia had 
a significant lead in its number of foreign fighters per million. This may come as a surprise 
based on Tunisia’s overall decent performance on its governance indicators, but after a 
closer look at the downward trends measured, the link between poor governance and 
discontent leading to increased militancy became evident.  
I. SOCIAL JUSTICE, REBELLION, AND THE APPEAL TO MILITANT 
ISLAMISM 
Egypt and Tunisia both showed a similar lack of performance on the Voice and 
Accountability metric while both also showed comparatively better performance on their 
Rule of Law metric. Both those metrics supported the assertion that oppressive non-
democratic institutions existed in both these countries. According to Social Theory, the 
absence of democratic institutions and safe outlets for dissent and self-expression, 
tendencies for violence and militancy are a natural outcome.  
This is evident in the cases of both Egypt and Tunisia, where the rise in Islamist 
militancy became the unintended outcome of social and political oppression. According to 
Baylouny, the non-democratic institutions of the Middle-East, that used coercive measures 
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to persecute those that pursued or simply advocated for political plurality, gave Islamists 
the upper hand when organizing. When no other options for political expression or dissent 
were available religious institutions became the rallying point for activist’s intent on 
mobilizing against oppressive governments in majority Muslim nations.  
According to Baylouny, “Religious movements have distinct advantages in 
authoritarian context.”80 Unlike other political movements, religious movements can 
expand their base of support through charities and other social welfare activities that cloak 
their political aspirations and provide a deprived public with much needed services. 
Baylouny asserted that religious institutions have the upper hand within authoritarian 
regimes because “the resources and networks requisite to mobilizing support, integral to 
social movement success, are also found in religion’s institutional legacy and its charitable 
activities.”81 Islamists, within politically repressive societies, can easily monopolize the 
political scene due to their unassuming and non-threatening disposition while pursuing 
economic and social justice. According to Baylouny, inclinations for violent jihad starts in 
native lands mired by governments with structural inadequacies. It is their 
disenfranchisement, alienation and oppression at home that drives radicalization and 
pushes them in the direction of violence. Those disenfranchised masses, as Baylouny 
convincingly asserts, provide global jihadis with the social base to draw from as they 
attempt to globalize a domestic spat.82 
Baylouny also offers an explanation for the lower levels of militancy observed in 
Morocco. Morocco was outperformed by Tunisia on all metrics except for Voice and 
Accountability. Morocco’s performance was by no means great, but relatively speaking it 
scored three time higher on Voice and Accountability in 2010, which was one year before 
the observed increase in violence. It is safe to assume that Moroccan’s perceived their 
government as more inclusive with some tolerance for self-expression and dissent.  
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It is those perceptions of political inclusion and tolerance that were likely to have 
curbed militant tendencies. Baylouny asserts that “Social Movement theory in particular 
demonstrates that local political inclusion can stimulate moderation, stemming the 
progression of militant Islamism in its infancy.”83 Baylouny’s approach applies the social 
theory lens introduced by Gurr to better understand militant Islamist movements equating 
them to the non-violent social movements seen in democratic societies.84 So when offered 
the political space to decent, they are likely to do it peacefully. 
Baylouny makes the optimistic assertion that given the right conditions and under 
the right circumstances, Islamist’s may also organize into social movements and participate 
in civil society.85 She adds that democratic theory, could play an active role in pacifying 
radical movements and ridding them of their violent tendencies. Structural reforms within 
government that offer an Islamist movement, a less risky alternative peaceful option, to 
expressing and acquiring political aspirations, would encourage a behavioral shift, away 
from violence. Instead Islamist movements are likely to adopt new norms and integrate 
within the greater government structure and participate in the political process. As a result, 
they would become fully vested in the system and would likely reduce affiliated violent 
groups to the fringes.  
Conversely, Baylouny warns that if a group is denied political inclusion or deemed 
illegal by government political and security institutions, they would lose the “incentive to 
moderate.”86 Findings from observing governance indicators from 2000–2010 strongly 
support Baylouny’s assertions. There was a direct positive correlation between each 
country’s performance on the Voice and Accountability governance indicator and their 
levels of observed militancy in the few years that followed. Those findings confirm the 
relationship between a countries level of democratic governance and the impact that has 
on their levels of observed militancy. 
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J. VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY VS. RULE OF LAW 
Based on observed findings, the Rule of Law governance indicator performed 
consistently across the ten years from 2000–2010 in all five countries observed. Rule of 
Law levels remained constant in Egypt and Morocco, while in Tunisia there were 
significant improvements. This is an indicator of either maintaining or increasing national 
resource allocation to the institutions contributing to the consistent or improved 
performance in that metric. In an environment of limited or diminishing financial 
resources, this means potentially redirecting resources that would potentially improve 
performances in others. The problem observed in both Tunisia and Egypt is that the Rule 
of Law is the only metric making improvements, while other metrics like Control of 
Corruption and Voice and Accountability see major setbacks. Such trends are indicative of 
institutional failures driving a growing frustration within a given population. 
When government institutions fail to provide basic services, and implement 
coercive measures to silence freedoms under the guise of law and order, it diminishes their 
legitimacy and is likely to increase a population’s level of dissatisfaction. Gurr associates 
that frustration and discontent with the “relative deprivation that ensues when there is a 
perceived deficit between a society’s expectations and the reality that they experience.87 
The declining scores overtime in both Egypt and Tunisia revealed a diminishing quality of 
life that was likely attributed to underperforming institutions that struggled to deliver on 
the governance indicators measured, eventually crossing a threshold. Crossing this critical 
threshold without a viable outlet for self-expression or dissent, evident by the low Voice 
and Accountability scores, gives a population no other choice but violence to achieve 
desired political outcomes. Hafez explains the shift from peaceful opposition to violent 
resistance that Islamist movements underwent in response to the repressive political 
measures instituted by dictatorships concerned about their diminishing power. According 
to Hafez, it is the structural challenges Islamists faced in Egypt that denied political 
inclusion and left Islamists with nothing to lose by turning to violence.88 
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Hafez also makes a strong case that advocates for the power of Voice and 
Accountability, enabled through democratic institutions. He argues that disenfranchised 
groups are likely to resort to violence only when militant action seems like the only 
available option to them. According to Hafez, Islamist movements that resort to violence 
perceive institutional channels for self-expression and dissention inaccessible, 
complicating the path for peaceful conflict resolution, and therefore justify violent action 
as the only viable option to pursue political, “not economic or psychological,” objectives.89 
Hafez asserts that contrary to conventional belief, attributing their militancy to “economic 
stagnation or excessive secularization,”90 it is their political environment defined by the 
governments structural restraints that led to their “lack of meaningful access to state 
institutions,”91 and ultimately drove them to extreme and violent measures.  
Exclusive mobilization structures, observed by low scores on the Voice and 
Accountability metric, provide the means according to Hafez for underground network 
expansion and “the diffusion of antisystem ideological frames to justify radical change and 
motivate collective violence.”92 The shift to the underground increases the movements 
propensity for violence. This shift institutionalizes covert practices relied on to evade a 
state’s security apparatus and as a result those movements become less likely to forgo open 
rebellious activity by design.93 Instead of addressing dissent through improved Voice and 
Accountability mechanisms that drive healthy institutional practices, Egypt and Tunisia 
implemented repressive, politically exclusive institutional structures that pushed activism 
underground, through Rule of Law mechanisms, that ultimately lead to rebellious and 
underground politically exclusive movements.  
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K. CONCLUSION 
The primary focus of this chapter was to link militant tendencies observed within 
certain populations in the MENA region with their countries’ performance on governance 
indicators. The causal link between increased militancy and governance indicators was 
then explained through social theory for a better understanding of how poor governance 
contributes to the frustration that increases the appeal for violent ideology that fuels the 
observed militancy. The five MENA countries selected for this research, Egypt, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, all had significant increases in observed militancy 
between 2011 and 2016. They offered sufficient observable data that facilitated this 
research.  
The data collected confirmed that poor governance does in fact contribute to 
militancy, but the variance in the numbers of militants per each country as it relates to how 
they performed on various governance indicators also provided additional valuable insight. 
The data overwhelmingly illustrated that the country with the highest score on the Voice 
and Accountability indicator, Morocco, did better than all countries observed in terms of 
its observed militancy. Morocco had significantly less Islamist inspired violent incidents 
at home, and was also the smallest exporter of foreign fighters, whereas both Egypt and 
Tunisia, recorded the highest numbers in domestic terrorism and foreign fighter exports 
respectively. The most obvious explanation in this analysis was the significant difference 
observed in Voice and Accountability scores, where Morocco, though underperformed 
globally, led the five MENA countries regionally. 
After establishing the causal chain that linked low performance in Voice and 
Accountability to increased militancy, this chapter focused on social theory for an in-depth 
understanding of the interplay between governance indicators and how that translates into 
the social friction credited for the violence. Gurr offers the relative deprivation theory that 
best explains how performance on certain governance indicators can lead to the frustration 
within a country’s population that fuels militancy. The declining performances on key 
governance indicators observed for Egypt and Tunisia, which likely translated to a 
diminishing quality of life, felt in real time by citizens of both countries, was a point of 
contention and frustration for most.  
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The lack of democratic governance, demonstrated by their performance on the 
Voice and Accountability indicator, in conjunction with a well performing coercive 
apparatus, derived from the consistent score on the Law and Order indicator, turns out to 
be a recipe for increased militancy. According to Baylouny, when analyzing Islamist 
movements to determine their likelihood for violence the following political indicators are 
necessary before jumping to conclusions: The prevailing power relations (i.e., do the 
people have a voice in selecting their leaders), how the group interacts within the power 
paradigm imposed by structural conditions within government (do the institutions hold 
government officials accountable) , the nature of the political system (i.e., is it open or 
closed by the state for the group’s participation?) and the group’s level of inclusion in the 
political system (i.e., is it a free and fair system that safely allows for self-expression and 
dissent).94 Baylouny equates the prospect of a group’s radicalization to their level of 
inclusion or exclusion in a state’s political system.95  
Finally, Hafez explains the dangers potentially faced by governments that lack 
Voice and Accountability and depend largely on a coercive apparatus to enforce the rule 
of Law. According to Hafez, it is the absence of a conflict resolution system within a state’s 
political structure that “encourages rebellion by delegitimizing the ruling regime and 
disempowering moderate voices within the movement.”96 Hafez concludes that “Muslims 
rebel because they are denied access to conventional means of political participation and 
because their organizations and members feel threatened by indiscriminate repressive 
policies.”97 
The social theory examples provided show the impacts of repressive and coercive 
governance, represented by the negative correlation between performances in the Rule of 
Law metric and the Voice and Accountability metric. When there is no room for dissent 
and self-expression, frustrated populations are likely to adopt militancy because of the 
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limited options available, not because it is their preferred method. The value of having 
institutionalized outlets for dissent is critical for curbing militancy within a society. This is 
evident with Morocco’s noticeably better performance in the Voice and Accountability 
metric, though still lacking, likely mitigated crossing a threshold and reduced the appeal 
for violent action.  
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III. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES 
A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
The previous chapter highlights the institutional deficits within the countries of the 
MENA region that contributed to the rise of Islamist militancy. Findings in Chapter II 
further reinforce past scholarly work on the rise of rebellious and militant behavior where 
domestic environments that lack representative institutions and governance contribute to 
that rise. Understanding those dynamics and then adding the U.S. foreign policy factor to 
the equation allows for better, more strategic decisions by U.S. policy makers. Gaddis adds 
to the discourse with his assertion that the root of the September 11th 2001 attacks on the 
U.S. were the nonrepresentative institutions within MENA societies that left people with 
no choice but militancy, sparked by religious fanaticism, as the only channel for dissent.98 
Understanding how U.S. foreign policy interacts in that space where allied leaders are not 
representative of the will of their people is critical to understanding the U.S. policy 
contribution to the resilience of militant Islamists in the MENA region. Only then can we 
begin to change the unwelcomed outcomes we see from heightened levels of anti-American 
sentiment, and the increased militancy that is in direct opposition to U.S. regional interests. 
B. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
Unpacking the impact of both past and present U.S. foreign policies on the attitudes 
shared by most in the MENA region will assist with understanding how those policies are 
perceived, how they generated grievances, and how those grievances fuel the anti-
American sentiment festering in the collective consciousness of many today. Ultimately 
the anti-American sentiment is what Jihadi organizations hoped to capitalize on for their 
legitimacy and recruitment initiatives. This causal chain provides a logical template for 
understanding the repercussions from U.S. foreign policy within the MENA region. It 
emphasizes the effect of grievances associated with perceived U.S. policy transgressions 
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on facilitating the evolution of a domestic Islamist social movement from peaceful 
opposition to local government into a persistent and violent global Jihadi phenomenon.  
C. BACKGROUND 
1. From Islamist Social Movement to Violent Jihad 
It is critical to make the distinction separating political Islam from its Jihadi cousin 
before explaining the causal chain that links them together. Islamic political activism 
(political Islam) typically takes the form of a nonviolent social movements or a political 
platform advocating for reform or procedural change. Jihadism, on the other hand, is a call 
to violent action that had historically followed failed popular attempts by activists and 
social movements for peaceful reform, change or transition of power. It is also important 
to note that the terms “Islamist” and “Jihadi” are not synonymous. Though early Jihadis 
had splintered from Islamist social movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood, that path of 
origin is not always the case. It is important to acknowledge Islamism as a political 
philosophy inspired by religious doctrine and Islamists as members of a social movement 
engaged in identity politics rather than suggesting that such groups always hold a space for 
jihadis. Additionally, like other political movements that had resorted to rebellion and 
violence when denied a legitimate political platform, transformations of Islamist groups 
into Jihadi groups, or shifting of individual sympathies from endorsing peaceful reform to 
supporting violent rebellion are typically associated with political suppression as observed 
through time in both Egypt and Algeria.  
The earliest examples of organized violent Jihadi movements have an observable 
history and emerged out of the context of political Islam which first emerged in Egypt to 
counter European domination in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.99 Modern day 
political Islam was inspired by Hassan al-Banna, an Egyptian activist and the founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. He grew up in the Egyptian delta at a time of observed foreign 
excess and Egyptian deprivation. Commins explains how the miserable living conditions 
Egyptians endured, when contrasted to the luxury accommodations provided to their 
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European counterparts working for the Suez Canal Company, would have a lasting impact 
on al-Banna. According to Commins, al-Banna’s drive for action was inspired by such 
inequities and would shape his resolute activism. Al-Banna would go on to found the 
Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that would infuse politics with religious dogma, in a 
departure from the traditional Islamic notions promoted in Egyptian society at the time.100 
According to Commins, Hassan Al-Banna simply sought to reform Egyptian 
society rather than overthrow the existing political order.101 The Muslim Brotherhood 
under al-Banna would champion social justice and public health reform to rid the 
population of the deficiencies that plagued Egyptian society. Like many social movements, 
Commins asserts, they advocated for a state that “would provide jobs and the means of 
livelihood for anyone able to work.”102 The Muslim Brotherhood sought reform, founded 
on sound social and Islamic principles, that facilitated Islamic governance, provided access 
to government services, healthcare, education and an overall improved quality of life for 
all Egyptians.103 Like many social movements, it was born out of necessity and an 
overarching sense of inadequacy that plagued Egyptian society. Hassan al-Banna created 
the Brotherhood as a counterweight to both foreign domination and secular activism, but 
did not foresee that his organization would become “a model that Muslim revivalists would 
replicate throughout the Arab world and beyond.”104  
Both Banna and Qutb played a critical role in pioneering political Islam in Egypt 
in both its peaceful activism and later inclusion of advocating for violent jihad. According 
to Robinson, they underwent a distinctive journey that went from peaceful political 
activism to promoting a hardened and more radical ideology that is credited for influencing 
Jihadism today. Islamists under the Brotherhood sought “to merge political modernity with 
Islam,”105 which put them directly at odds with Egypt’s secular nationalist fervor that was 
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prevalent at the time. Violent clashes with the Egyptian government led to the 
imprisonment and persecution of large numbers of Muslim Brotherhood members giving 
rise to a more radicalized fringe that would emerge. Sayyid Qutb, who started off as a 
secular nationalist and mid-level bureaucrat, would join the brotherhood then radicalize in 
prison when the Egyptian government cracked down on the Brotherhood’s activism. He 
would later emerge as the organization’s leader. 
Fast forward slightly over a decade Qutb’s activism, according to Robinson, would 
provide a template for the Jihadi activism that followed and is prevalent today. Qutb 
basically lay the foundations that would later justify violence in the form of armed Jihad 
pursued by both Sunni and Shia ideologues alike. Qutb would borrow from Salafi doctrine, 
a school of Islamic jurisprudence inspired by a 9th century interpretation of the Quran that 
frowns upon any nonliteral transliteration of the text,106 and author the publication known 
as the milestones, which according to Robinson “was for jihadis as Lenin’s What Is To Be 
Done? was for Communist agitators: a justification and guidebook for revolutionary 
change.”107 Qutb would also introduce the concept of Jahilliyya, which described a 
barbaric state of existence that pre-dated Islam in Arab lands, and inspired Jihadis to adopt 
violent means to confront and defeat that state of existence as did the forefathers of Islam.  
Jihadism in its current form derives its ideology from innovations in Salafi doctrine 
adopted by Qutb. It is basically an ideology inspired by Salafism, built while enduring 
cruelty, and perverted in a prison cell before launching to oppressed Muslim communities 
elsewhere promising them salvation, freedom and justice through violent action. Though 
the Brotherhood at its inception did not advocate for violence, the hardline Salafi -Jihadi 
movements today owe their ideological pedigree to key Brotherhood figures such as 
Hassan al Banna, and Sayyid Qutb.108 Having both been imprisoned and sentenced to 
death in Egypt, they would leave behind a doctrinal legacy born of pain and hardship.  
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Building on lessons of the past, global jihad today is an offshoot of what Robinson 
referred to as the Jihadi International which was first introduced by the Islamist ideologue 
Abdullah Yussuf Azzam. Azzam was an activist who joined the Muslim Brotherhood 
Branch in Jordan at a young age and a credentialed cleric that graduated from al Azhar in 
Egypt in the early 1970s.109 Azzam played a pivotal role in the recruitment and logistical 
support of the Arab Mujahideen during the Afghan Jihad. He envisioned and attempted to 
develop a pool of mujahideen under what became the Al Qaeda organization, that would 
travel to troubled Muslim lands in an attempt to free the Muslim population from 
oppression by the nonbelievers.110 This was the beginning of a regional movement intent 
on internationalizing the Brotherhood’s doctrine under one active polity.  
After the end of the Soviet-Afghan War and the sudden death of Azzam, Bin Laden 
emerged as the leader of the al Qaeda organization founded by Azzam. Embittered by the 
Saudi government’s decision to allow for U.S. intervention in the 1991 War to liberate 
Kuwait, along with the failure of Islamist activism to affect change in Egypt and Algeria, 
he redirects Jihad efforts toward the west and specifically the United States, who he called 
the Far Enemy. This was in contrast to the Near Enemy, which was seen as the apostate 
regimes within the Arab Muslim World (i.e. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi) previously 
targeted by Jihadists.111  
Al Qaeda’s shift in strategy from targeting the Near Enemy to targeting the Far 
Enemy is best understood by observing how populations within the MENA region perceive 
U.S. foreign policy. It is the grievances, from perceived policy transgressions, that most 
likely fueled the anti-American sentiment and created the conditions necessary for the 
operational shift undertook by Al Qaeda and the Jihadi movement it inspired. Though 
shortly after Bin Laden’s death and the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
the Far Enemy efforts among Jihadi movements was subordinated to the establishment of 
a territorial state, and the grievances fueling the anti-American sentiment were broadcasted 
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incessantly and effectively for recruitment efforts and for legitimizing the violence 
propagated by that proto-state. Today those grievances are continuously leveraged for 
recruitment and for widespread appeal by violent Islamists intent on attacking U.S. 
interests at home and abroad. 
2. From Jihadi Ally to Menacing Nemesis
Understanding the historical journey of political Islam from a social movement 
lens provided much needed insight into why elements of that movement resorted to 
violence. Then following the progress of what became an organized violent movement, 
and the role U.S. policy makers played in that transformation helps with understanding 
how and why the United States went from the facilitator of Jihad to the target of its 
violence. 
This section offers a background on how U.S. foreign policy makers first came into 
contact with Islamist and Jihadi movements and how that relationship morphed over time 
from what appeared to be a benevolent partnership to an ambivalent and spiteful existence. 
American national interests and political Islam have not always been so divisive and at 
odds. In the early 1950s, there was a nationalist secular wave that spread throughout the 
Arab States in North Africa, the Levant, and Yemen. At first U.S. policy makers under 
Eisenhower tried to normalize relationships with those newly formed popular states. 
However, by the early 1960s, young Arab republics, led by Nasser’s Egypt, advocated for 
Arab unity under a socialist system of governance believed to have favored the Soviet 
Union.112 To counterbalance a potential Soviet-Arab alliance, U.S. policy makers, 
according to Bhattacharya, pursue`d improved relations with Saudi Arabia and encouraged 
“a holy Islamic alliance to isolate Egypt in regional politics.”113 Alliances with other 
Muslim countries, like Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and others were 
pursued as part of a U.S. containment strategy against Soviet regional encroachment. In 
those years of what seemed to be an escalating Cold War, Islamic affiliation was considered 
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Soviet-proof and therefore preferred over secular nationalist governments with socialist 
underpinnings. 
The 1970s would see a recalibration of U.S. strategy in the Arab-Muslim Middle 
East. American-Egyptian relationship would inch toward an alliance, whereas the 
American-Iranian relationship would sever and Iran, once a staunch ally, would view the 
United States as its mortal enemy.114 It was not until the 1970s, approximately three 
decades into the Cold War, that Iran would be the first country where Islamic extremism 
surfaced as an expanding threat to U.S. national security interests. According to 
Bhattacharya, “for the first time, an Islamic country demonized the U.S. calling it the 
‘Great Satan’, and by holding 52 Americans hostage for 444 days, inflicted humiliation 
and created a deep sense of powerlessness among policy-makers.”115 The only other 
significant act of defiance by a Muslim country was Saudi Arabia’s oil embargo shortly 
after the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Though intended to squeeze concessions from Israel’s 
supporters on the Palestinian cause, Western observers saw Saudi’s actions as an attempt 
for Islamic resurgence.  
In the early 1980s the Iran-Iraq war took center stage in U.S. foreign policy circles, 
distracting policy makers from developments in political Islam within Iran and elsewhere 
in the shadows of Arab regimes. Consecutively, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would 
mark a decade of cooperation between Jihadist elements inspired by political Islam and the 
United States. In an attempt to thwart Soviet overreach, American policy practitioners 
endorsed the recruitment of Mujahideen from throughout the Islamic world, to fight the 
Soviets in Afghanistan. These actions unwittingly laid the foundations for the organized 
militant Islamist movements that followed. U.S. foreign policy at the time called for 
collaboration with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to facilitate the transfer of personnel, funds, 
weapons, and equipment to the front lines of its proxy fight against the Soviet Union, 
projecting a façade of a strong alliance built on cooperation between Jihadists and their 
American handlers.  
 
114 Bhattacharya, 22. 
115 Bhattacharya, 22. 
52 
This short-lived alliance of convenience between the U.S. and militant Islamists 
would quickly fade away once the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and the organized 
band of Jihadists, emboldened by their victory against a world power, would scan the globe 
for their next adventure. The adventures chosen by those militant Islamists would 
ultimately clash with U.S. foreign policy interests and initially find a widescale of support 
in a landscape marred by anti-American sentiment and a litany of unaddressed grievances.  
D. DATA ON ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT 
Widescale anti-American sentiment is what confines U.S. soft power projection in 
the MENA region. It is the anti-American sentiment from grievances left unaddressed that 
legitimized the Jihadi cause and brought it into the mainstream. The words “anti-American 
sentiment” are often thrown together when describing negative attitudes toward the United 
States, but it is not always apparent what those words actually mean. Anti-American 
sentiment could mean a wide range of attitudes on a spectrum from simply disagreeing 
with certain U.S. foreign policies, to resenting such policies, to complete hatred and 
wishing harm to the United States and the American people.  
The Pew Research Center surveys on International Opinion Towards the United 
States and on the Confidence in Bin Laden represented in Figures 11 and 12, both offer 
unique perspectives on how the U.S. is perceived throughout the MENA region. While the 
perceptions based on favorability ratings may offer the breadth of the varying degrees of 
anti-American sentiment, the level of confidence in bin Laden offers the depth and intensity 
of that anti-American sentiment harbored within a certain segment of MENA society.  
Both Figures 11 and 12 each offer a critical piece that can be used for analysis in 
determining the level of anti-American sentiment within a given MENA State. The Zogby 
research presented at the end of this section offers valuable insight on the negative impacts 
of anti-American sentiment on U.S. foreign policy aspirations within the MENA region.  
It is evident from the data presented that most populations within the countries 
surveyed do not have a favorable opinion of the United States, but the added metric on the 
Confidence in Osama bin Laden , presented in Figure 12, is where we can safely assume a 
positive correlation between the results portraying a high confidence level in bin Laden 
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and the intensity of Anti-American sentiment in the countries surveyed. Widescale 
confidence in a leader of a terrorist organization intent on destroying the United States, 
within populations of countries that receive billions of dollars in U.S. aid should be a cause 
for concern.  
Figure 11 offers opinions from within four MENA countries: Jordan, Egypt, 
Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Information on Kuwait, Tunisia, and Morocco was 
limited and therefore was not included in the analysis, and Israel, though technically a 
MENA country does not share the regions common history and culture, hence does not fit 
within the scope of this research. Figure 12 offers an interesting variable that captures the 
level of Confidence in Osama bin Laden from 2002 to 2011. This dynamic when combined 
with the data from Figure 11 could provide much needed insight to the degree and intensity 
of anti-American sentiment observed. Countries with a high unfavorable rating toward the 
U.S. and high confidence in Bin Laden are likely to harbor a more intense anti- American 
sentiment, whereas countries with lower unfavorable percentage ratings and lower 
confidence in Bin Laden are likely to have less of an anti-American sentiment. 
Information from all three surveys offers a valuable dichotomy to U.S. policy 
ambitions versus the actual outcomes. Though the surveys capture a generally noticeable 
anti-American trend, the MENA countries with the least favorable opinions of the United 
States were the ones receiving the largest sums of U.S. aid. The results further emphasize 
the centrality of perceived grievances to the U.S. image, that if left unaddressed could 
hamper sustainable policy objectives.  
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Figure 11. Pew Center Survey on International Opinion Toward the 
United States116 
 
Figure 12. Pew Center Survey on Confidence in Osama bin Laden117 
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1. Interpreting the Data 
Both figures are placed on the same page for the sake of comparison. Three of the 
four countries plotted in Figure 11 show a high unfavourability rating of the United States 
averaging approximately 80%. Lebanon was the only country with favorability ratings 
averaging closer to 50%. Though the results from Figure 11 are telling of a widescale anti-
American sentiment in the MENA region, it is the Confidence in bin Laden approval rating 
that is a cause for concern. 
The Confidence in Osama bin Laden percentage ratings are likely a better indicator 
of anti-American sentiment in the countries surveyed. 2003 marks an extremely high level 
of confidence in bin Laden in both Jordan and the Palestinian territories with 61% and 
72%% expressing their support respectively. Lebanon was the only other country surveyed 
in 2003 with a 19% approval rating for bin Laden. Though significantly lower than the 
other two countries surveyed Lebanon registers its highest approval of bin Laden that year. 
Lebanon’s approval percentage drops significantly to 4% the following year and continues 
to drop reaching 0% and 1% in 2010 and 2011. Lebanon registers the lowest confidence in 
bin Laden percentage rating out of all other MENA countries surveyed.  
The survey’s data on Egypt starts in 2006, where the only other country surveyed 
was Jordan. Egypt shows a slightly higher percentage than Jordan for that year with a 27% 
confidence in bin Laden rating vs. Jordan’s 24%. Egypt and Jordon would both stay under 
30% for the rest of the years surveyed whereas the Palestinian territories, though trending 
downwards, maintained a confidence rating of over 50% until 2009. In 2011, the majority 
in the Palestinian territories appeared to have lost confidence in bin Laden recording a 34% 
confidence rating, which is almost a 40% drop from when they were first surveyed in 2003. 
Understanding the drivers of the incongruence between policy intent and policy 
outcomes will help shed light on why communities in the MENA region are skeptical and 
mistrusting of declared U.S. foreign policy affecting their region. Two countries with some 
of the most concerning trends observed, are among the highest global recipients of U.S. 
foreign aid, according to the Congressional Research Service report prepared by Sharp et. 
al. Per the report, both Jordan and Egypt were collectively second only to Israel in projected 
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aid allocations for FY21 and were among the top recipients of U.S. aid from 1946 to present 
day.118 The Pew Research Center surveys exposed a big disconnect between U.S. foreign 
policy aspirations in Egypt and Jordan, expressed by fiscal contributions, and foreign 
policy perceptions as interpreted by the opinions of the populations of these two countries 
of high interest.  
Jordan is an interesting case to follow because of the intensity of the anti-American 
sentiment harbored within its borders. It shows both high levels of confidence in Osama 
bin Laden, and a significantly low opinion of the U.S. as shown in Figures 11 and 12 around 
the time of the Iraq War in 2003. In 2002, the Pew survey reports a U.S. favorability rating 
of 25%, which is significantly low for a country receiving such high amounts of U.S. 
foreign aid. Though that rating makes a sharp decline with almost a unanimous negative 
view of the U.S. in 2003, at the onset of the Iraq War, it never completely bounces back 
leaving Jordanians with a U.S. view that is visibly trending downwards over time.119 The 
confidence in Osama bin Laden percentage also increased in 2004 reaching approximately 
61%,120 signifying a high level of sympathy and concurrence with the Jihadi cause and the 
grievances espoused by its leaders. The Jordanian people’s approval of al Qaeda, signified 
by the Confidence in Osama bin Laden poll takes a dip in 2005, shortly after Jordan fell 
victim to terrorist bombings claimed by Al Qaeda in Iraq.121 Though bin Laden’s 
popularity wanes, the U.S. image in the region remains tarnished with many in Jordan 
attributing the regions misfortunes to U.S. foreign policy.122 
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U.S. foreign policy decisions like the Iraq War had a long-lasting impact on how 
the U.S. was perceived, and is still perceived in the MENA region. The Bush administration 
policy to democratize the region after 9–11, starting with Operation Iraqi Freedom, though 
noble and ambitious, was not welcomed by the people of the region. This is evident from 
the Pew public opinion polls covering that timeframe. It is safe to assume that the public 
opinion polls are more than simply portraying an unfavorable opinion of the United States. 
The consistent lack of a favorable opinion of the U.S. in Egypt and Jordan, with 
unfavourability ratings as good as 69% and as bad as 85% of the population in the fifteen 
years after the Iraq invasion, are indicative of the anti-American sentiment that continues 
to thrive in the region despite the U.S. foreign aid expenditures and the foreign policy 
initiatives intended to demonstrate good faith and serve U.S. regional interests.  
2. Zogby Report 
The first two surveys provided by the Pew Research Center helped with a better 
understanding of what is meant by anti-American sentiment and the degree it is shared by 
the greater population in the MENA region. The third data point is from Zogby Research 
Services and offers insight into how the U.S. stacks in popularity throughout the MENA 
region in relation to other key countries and Global powers. The Zogby report is critical in 
a world of great power competition where the battle for the hearts and minds around the 
globe is increasingly relevant. 
In the 2018 Zogby Research Services report on Middle East public opinion, 
attitudes of various MENA countries toward other countries where measured. Findings 
from the report were intriguing and telling of the lack of effectiveness of U.S. foreign 
policy in the MENA region. Unfavourability ratings were no surprise and were consistent 
with the Pew polls referenced earlier in this section. The most telling statistics came from 
Iraq, Iran, Egypt, and Jordan. Both Iraq and Egypt recorded the lowest U.S. favorability 
ratings and both recording an 8% favorable rating of the U.S. Iraq, which is a country that 
was central to regional U.S. foreign policy in the better part of the 21st Century, had a 
population that regarded China (50%), Russia (48%), Iran (58%), and Turkey (60%) with 
significantly higher regard, than they did the United States. Egypt, the largest population 
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in the region, and largest Arab recipient of U.S. foreign aid, had a population that thought 
only of Iran (3%) as less favorable than the United states. Ironically, Iran saw the U.S. 
more favorably (32%) than did Iraq (8%), Egypt (8%), and Tunisia (30%). Finally, Jordan 
(37%), the second highest Arab recipient of U.S. aid, was second only to Lebanon (48%) 
among non-oil states in U.S. favorability ratings. Even then Jordanians viewed China, 
Russia, and Turkey with higher regard than they did the United States.123 Those numbers 
are concerning and speak to an anti-American sentiment that had persisted and grown in 
the region over the decades of increased U.S. engagement. 
Ultimately it is somewhere within this space where anti-American sentiment thrives 
that militant Islamists, like Al Qaeda, operate and are provided safe haven. Though 
confidence in bin Laden appears to have diminished over time along with the sympathy for 
the Jihadi cause, it is premature to claim a victory while the majority of people within the 
MENA region continue to view the United States in a negative light. Understanding and 
addressing the grievances, both old and new, fueling this negative sentiment is critical to 
devising sustainable policy that is likely to withstand the test of time. The next section in 
this chapter will provide a historical background of key U.S. policies that have generated 
grievances in parts of the region while simultaneously bolstering the popularity and 
confidence in the Jihadi cause.  
E. GRIEVANCES PAST AND PRESENT 
Starting with two Cold War policies that, though served immediate U.S. interests 
to counter Soviet encroachment at the time, failed to account for domestic undercurrents, 
that would ultimately shape the negative impressions associated with the anti-Americanism 
surrounding regional U.S. foreign policy. Those perceptions were shaped by the MENA 
population’s collective experience as they aspired to achieve the Wilsonian ideal, captured 
by Mead, in the form of self-determination and democratic governance.124 Those same 
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populations then watched as their aspirations were shattered by perceived foreign 
intervention from the same powers that broadcasted the liberal values that inspired the self-
determination and self-governance they sought to emulate. 
Those perceived foreign policy encroachments start with the acquiescence to the 
colonial project in Greater Syria, represented by the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, 
and with U.S. and British intervention in Iran, characterized by unseating an elected prime 
minister. Those two pivotal policy decisions would generate life-long grievances and have 
lasting regional impacts that shaped regional perceptions in the decades that followed. 
Presenting those two historical examples, before introducing the implications of more 
recent U.S. foreign policy, offers a much-needed scene setter that establishes the conditions 
in the domestic social and political space that regional U.S. foreign policy aspired to 
influence. After establishing the historical context for the grievances shared by many in the 
MENA region, this section will look at more recent policies, like the support of oppressive 
regimes and the Iraq War, that actively added to the grievances of the past.  
This section addresses regional grievances through the lens of what are perceived 
as some of the most contentious U.S. foreign policy decisions within the MENA region. It 
starts with the unwavering U.S. support to Israel, despite the humanitarian repercussions 
in Palestinian lives and suffering that endured from the inception of the Zionist State till 
modern day. Next will be the events that unfolded in Iran in the 1950s, with the ousting of 
an elected official in a collaborative effort between the United States and the British and 
re-instating the unpopular Shah of Iran. Those two historical policy references provided 
the basis for an anti-American sentiment that more recent U.S. policies failed to account 
for. The point here is that U.S. policy initiatives in the region were seen through the lens 
of past policies, and it is the anti-American sentiment as a result of those past policies that 
created the operating space within the MENA region that U.S. policy makers still attempted 
to navigate.  
Additional policy themes that are extremely unpopular with the populations in the 
MENA region, and are attributed to a growing anti-American sentiment, include U.S. 
support for a number of corrupt autocratic and oppressive regimes, and U.S. policies after 
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9/11 which include the perceived as unprovoked invasion of Iraq.125 All of the previously 
mentioned policies are perceived by many in the region as a demonstrated apathy or lack 
of interest in humanitarian transgressions directed toward Muslims and therefore seen as 
unbalanced and unjust. They perpetuate narratives that fuel anti-American sentiment and 
are therefore diminishing America’s democratic appeal and re-enforcing perceptions of the 
U.S. as a neo-imperialistic crusader with aggressive and hostile intentions.126  
1. The Case of Palestine 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is probably the least popular regional U.S. policy, 
and a severe source of antagonism. The United States’ staunch support for Israel, despite 
Israel’s perceived disregard for humanitarian violations against the Palestinians, is by far 
the oldest and arguably one of the principal historical drivers of anti-American 
sentiment.127 It is almost impossible to address anti-American sentiment and grievances 
as a result of U.S. foreign Policy in the MENA region without addressing the Palestinian 
Israeli conflict. This conflict was for decades the number one reason for regional unrest. 
Even recently, according to Zogby’s 2018 poll, the majority of countries in the MENA 
region considered “ending the occupation of Palestinian lands” to be their number one 
issue, more important than “resolving the conflict in Syria” and the “danger of Iranian 
interference.”128 This finding alone offers a stark inconsistency between U.S. regional 
priorities and the priorities of the majority of those who live in the region.  
The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 created a humanitarian problem that grew 
over the years in both scope and impact on the region’s collective consciousness. 
Palestinian refugees still occupy camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, West Bank, and Gaza. 
In places like Lebanon they are deprived of two basic right like work and land 
 
125 Byman, The Five Front War, 10–11. 
126 Cordesman, “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism,’” 102. 
127 Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, “Key Considerations in Counterideological Work against Terrorist 
Ideology,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 6 (September 1, 2006): 531–58, https://doi.org/10.1080/
10576100600791058. 
128 Zogby, Zogby, and Zogby, “Middle East Public Opinion,” 7. 
61 
ownership.129 There are generations of Arabs throughout the MENA region, many still 
alive today, that have witnessed the Palestinian struggle, sympathize with it, and are 
frustrated by the lack of action to addressing it, both by domestic and global leadership. 
The humanitarian matter of the Palestinian refugees remains a contentious issue today and 
continues to fuel anti-American sentiment in the region and throughout the Muslim 
community. It has provided a “righteous” cause for violent Jihadi movements and 
legitimized their heinous acts.  
According to Byman, the “blinding bias towards Israel,” is among the central 
grievances capitalized upon by Jihadi movements.130 Narratives of Israeli occupation of 
and perceived American complicity are often used in Jihadi recruitment communication 
campaigns to widen their support base and in efforts to radicalize their audiences. U.S. 
support to the Zionist state is perceived as a modern-day colonial venture intent on 
subverting the Muslims of the MENA region, thus contributing to the anti-American 
sentiment that complicates achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.131 
2. The Case of Iran  
The Islamic republic of Iran is seen by many as the first successful effort to create 
an Islamist government in the MENA region. The clash between the Islamic Republic and 
U.S. policy makers is what makes this shift in power in Iran so significant. Without looking 
at relevant historical context it is easy to see the Iran-U.S. impasse in the terms of 
incompatible values as often portrayed by political pundits, but this mostly antagonist 
relationship between U.S. policy makers and Islamists of different varieties can be traced 
to perceived policy overreach that goes back to the mid-twentieth century. One of the 
earliest policies contributing to the development of extremist Islamic movements includes 
covert action in Iran designed to overthrow “the moderate constitutional government of 
Mohammad Mussadiq, followed by years of close [U.S.] military and political support for 
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the undemocratic and often brutal regime of the Shah.”132 The decision to overthrow 
Mussadiq was born out of perceived necessity in a bi-polar competition for power between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. Some policy makers were concerned with 
Mussadiq’s socialist inclinations and therefore his propensity to embrace Soviet 
doctrine.133 This is an example of a policy intended for Soviet containment, but with a 
completely different and unexpected outcome. Bhattacharya traces the anti-American 
sentiment and the “rise of Islamic revolutionary forces in Iran,”134 to specifically this U.S. 
policy which arguably delivered today’s Islamic Republic of Iran. The Shah would be seen 
as an American puppet, by the majority of Iranians and his violent oppression of public 
dissent would increase popular resentment toward him and U.S. policy makers that were 
seen as his guarantors. It is under those conditions that the Islamic Revolution would sweep 
through Iran, ousting the Shah and creating a state sponsored anti-American sentiment, that 
justified Jihad through institutions committed to removing western and foreign influence 
from the region. 
The domestic dynamics born out of the coup would ultimately shape the 
relationship between the U.S. and Iran. The prosperous relationship between the two 
countries in the years following the coup completely masked the undercurrent of 
resentment shared by a large swath of the Iranian population that held the U.S. responsible 
for meddling in Iranian domestic affairs. Though Iran would modernize and grow 
economically during this twenty-five-year period, the resentment to the Shah’s 
increasingly oppressive rule, according to Gasiorowski, “generated a new challenge…that 
differs from the one posed by Mossadiq: nondemocratic, violent, and deeply anti-
American.”135 U.S. policy makers indulged in the immediate political and economic gains, 
that appeared to have worked, and were completely blindsided by the Islamic Revolution 
that would change the course of regional history.  
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Iran offered a great example of how Islamists that were radicalized under the Shah’s 
oppressive rule equated the Shah’s domestic policies to a U.S. foreign policy extension and 
then capitalize on the anti-American sentiment resulting from that association. Extreme 
ideologues would band together and plot his removal from power. They would exploit an 
anti-American sentiment already in place to grow their support base and increase their 
movements legitimacy and resilience.  
3. Support of Oppressive Regimes  
Other U.S. policies believed to have contributed to anti-American sentiment 
according to Bhattacharya, include support for the repressive Nimieri dictatorship in 
Sudan, and support for Mubarak’s autocratic and often oppressive rule in Egypt.136 Those 
policies, which implicated the United States with the non-democratic oppressive regimes 
within MENA, were among the early contributors to the affinity with the Islamist cause 
and the ideology it propagated. The 1990s would see an increase in Islamist terrorist 
activity, with attacks on U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military interests. The terrorist 
attacks would continue to increase in boldness and intensity culminating with the attacks 
on 9/11 which were the manifestation of anger and a reaction to a perceived American 
foreign policy duplicity in the Arab and Muslim World.  
Understanding the root cause of such unintended negative perceptions begins with 
understanding the domestic political dynamics within the countries of the MENA region. 
On one hand U.S. policy makers promoted democracy and self-determination and on the 
other hand they were seen as staunch supporters to the regions oppressive regimes and 
therefore culpable to their atrocities in the eyes of many. According to Maghraoui, for a lot 
of people in the MENA region American anti-terrorism rhetoric appeared disjointed and 
lacked the necessary accurate historical references that sound policy should emerge 
from.137 To them there was a clear gap between word and deed. Those complex dynamics 
are what policy makers find themselves entangled in as they manage perceptions and 
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pursue American foreign policy initiatives in the MENA region and elsewhere in the 
Muslim world. 
4. Post 9/11 U.S. Policy 
After 9/11 the Bush administration focused on three main efforts to combat Islamic 
extremism. Those included: “the global war on terrorism, the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative (MEPI) to promote democratic reform, and the public diplomacy campaign to 
improve America’s image in the Muslim world.”138 At first glance and to Middle East 
policy advocates those efforts looked comprehensive and viable. Who would not rally 
behind fighting terrorism while simultaneously working on democratization initiatives and 
then tell the world about it to improve America’s image in the Muslim world? Instead of 
wide support for U.S. efforts in the Muslim world the Bush administration found itself 
immersed in a quagmire of Muslim resentment and a significant rise in anti-American 
sentiment. 
Maghraoui points out that part of the challenge was that the three stated objectives 
were in direct opposition to one another: “For example, the global war on terrorism requires 
the cooperation of security services that form the backbone of authoritarian regimes in 
Muslim countries. Such cooperation undermines both democratic ambitions and the effort 
to change negative attitudes about the United States in the Muslim world.”139 Though 
noble in intent, policy makers failed to address the complexity of such an undertaking and 
instead executed an incomprehensive strategy “that conflate [d] various Islamist groups 
into a monolithic threat, regardless of political, ideological, or strategic motivations.”140 
As a result, instead of achieving desired objectives the Bush administration found itself 
backpedaling from stated assertions, failing to meet regional objectives, and discrediting 
U.S. policy initiatives in the Muslim world.  
 
138 Maghraoui, 4. 
139 Maghraoui, 4. 
140 Maghraoui, 4. 
65 
F. CONCLUSION 
U.S. policy makers find themselves today limited to a number of bad options in the 
Middle East. They find themselves mired in attempting to answer complex and difficult 
questions about policy options in the MENA region and the wider Muslim world. Policy 
decisions in places like Egypt, Iran, Syria, Libya and Iraq, to name just a few, are not as 
simple as U.S. policy makers and politicians would like them to be. Blanchard further 
explains how “working with partners in these countries carries risks of influencing 
underlying political disputes in unpredictable ways or inadvertently empowering parties to 
local conflicts that may be hostile to U.S. security or preferences.”141 Decision makers are 
often having to pick between a bad choice and the worst alternative when tackling the 
challenges presented in a multi-dimensional operating space speckled with anti-American 
sentiment. The Syrian example alone offers complexities presented by domestic and 
international players all seeking to manipulate strategic outcomes and promote their often-
conflicting strategic interests.  
Even under the conditions mentioned earlier, the United States had expended vast 
resources and spent billions of dollars on the fight against violent Salafi Jihadis. Both the 
Obama and Trump administrations had followed suit, enacting former Bush administration 
legislation authorizing the use of military force against “groups and individuals associated 
with the Islamic State (IS) and participating in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners.”142 Blanchard and Humund depict the scope and magnitude of counter 
IS operations stating that “the executive branch has acknowledged military operations 
against Islamic State targets in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, the Philippines, Niger, and 
Somalia.”143 In Syria and Iraq alone “as of August 2017, U.S. and coalition forces had 
used combat aircraft, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and sea-launched cruise missiles to 
conduct more than 24,500 strikes against Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria since 
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August 8, 2014, and September 22, 2014, respectively.”144 All those operations, though 
effective in taking the fight to the enemy, fail to address anti-American sentiment that 
continues to grow despite U.S. military efforts. At best, current U.S. policy applies tactical 
Band-Aides in a strategic quagmire with no end in sight while on the current path. 
Ultimately blanket grievances are convenient and easy tools used by jihadists to 
rouse public support and justify their cause. Groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda, often 
superficially appear to give a voice to the muted oppressed while completely focusing on 
widening their base and prioritizing their interests. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a great 
example of how extremist groups appeal to a largely anti-American Arab audience. Though 
very real in its magnitude and effect on the Arab and Muslim psyche, the Palestinian plight 
is a good example of how Jihadists manipulate sentiment felt from real grievances to widen 
their support base. Palestinian suffering and Israel’s culpability, today, is only one among 
a litany of grievances facing societies in the MENA region. The Palestinian cause had 
become more of a slogan rather than a primary heart felt factor facilitating radicalization. 
Islamists bring the Palestinian plight into the picture when they are attempting to widen 
their platform beyond a local support base and to help project a global façade to their band 
of rejects.  
All those grievances previously mentioned are typically associated with 
humanitarian violations and perceived international apathy to the pursuit of justice by an 
aggrieved social base within the MENA region. Where the U.S. is seen apathetic, Jihadis 
on the other hand acknowledge those grievances and address them when they communicate 
with the Global Muslim community. Their message resonates with a disheartened majority 
in a space where U.S. foreign policy is perceived as a central obstacle to their shared 
struggle for decency, equality, and social justice. This ultimately increases affinity to 
Jihadist movements that appear to listen to and address those grievances with their 
resonating self-righteous narratives. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT 
Understanding the operational space in which U.S. policy unfolds is critical for all 
U.S. foreign policy practitioners, both military and civilian alike. Understanding the 
complexities within the operating environment allows for nuanced reporting that drives 
informed decision making. The MENA region’s modern history offers ample precedent, that 
should be examined for relevant and sustainable policy. What appears as great policy at first 
should not be simply taken at face value based on parochial success. Poor governance within 
the MENA region along with regional grievances, stemming from past U.S. foreign policy, 
believed to be exacerbating the anti-American sentiment today define the operating space U.S. 
policy makers attempt to navigate today. This space which is exacerbated by unpopular 
foreign policy and defined by an overwhelming anti-American sentiment, is where U.S. 
foreign policy practitioners attempt to implement the National Security Strategy and to pursue 
both diplomatic and military objectives.  
Modern day policy initiatives like the Abraham Accords, signed between the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Israel, offer a great example of a contemporary case to 
which insights from this thesis are applicable. As with the findings in the policy case studies 
discussed in Chapter III (i.e. Iran, Palestine, Oppressive regimes, and policies after 9/11) the 
accords should be examined within the social and political context of the larger MENA region 
for increased awareness of the challenges that may arise as the policy begins to unfold. 
Though the Abraham Accords could be a step in the right direction, without addressing the 
regional governance deficits, explored in detail in Chapter II, and the grievances fueling anti-
American sentiment covered in Chapter III, the chances of a sustainable peace plan quickly 
diminish.  
The actual impact of the Abraham Accords is likely to remain unknown for now. The 
sentiment expressed by the popular undercurrent within the MENA region is probably a better 
indicator, offering a broader perspective, of likely policy success or failure. Historical 
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precedent offers valuable insight for policy makers to draw from as they engage within the 
MENA region in pursuit of U.S. national security objectives. 
Accepting the Abraham Accords at face value offers a mirage of peace and could lead 
to strategic complacency. This is similar to what happened in Iran under the Shah where policy 
makers turned a blind eye to the popular undercurrent that was gaining momentum over the 
years. Plotting and executing the ouster of a democratically elected prime minister in Iran, 
though seemed like the better option at the time, would prove to be a strategic mistake that 
did more to threaten rather than bolster U.S. national security objectives in the MENA region. 
Iran went from ally to the United States’ regional antagonist, a nemesis, consistently pursuing 
foreign policy initiatives that counter U.S. strategic interests. This includes its support to 
proxies that attack oil fields in Saudi Arabia and actively fight to prop up a dictator in Syria. 
Iran has actively trained and equipped proxies such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in 
Lebanon and Syria, the Badr brigades and other Shia paramilitary militias in Iraq.  
Iranians feel their actions and anti-American sentiment is justified based on U.S. 
actions in 1953 that still haunt their memories today. U.S. support for the Shah after toppling 
a democratically elected government is a narrative Iranian conservatives resort to every time 
moderate leaders engage in diplomacy initiatives with the United States. Instead of a strong 
and reliable regional friend with vast resources, Iran has become public enemy number one 
in the Middle East. They now have a government with a hardened anti-American sentiment, 
self-proclaimed divine right to rule, and coercive internal mechanisms to quell descent as 
demonstrated in the late 90s and a decade ago with the Green Revolution.  
The focal point of U.S. regional foreign policy should be addressing the increase in 
militant tendencies along with the overwhelming anti-American sentiment expressed by the 
MENA population. The larger problem in the Middle East today is not the risk of an Arab 
Israeli War that the Abraham Accords are designed to forestall. Rather it is the Islamist 
militancy observed in Chapter II in Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan that is the real 
threat to regional stability. Condoning the root cause of unrest in the region and then 
promoting unpopular policies, is likely to further embolden Islamist militants and increase 
their resilience within the disenfranchised populations of the MENA region.  
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Until U.S. policy accounts for the regional public sentiment that is typically masked 
and not represented by the autocratic and non-democratic governments, policies in the region 
are likely to be less sustainable and have unforeseen negative consequences. This lack of 
representation is largely the driving cause behind the unrest and violence we had seen 
throughout the Muslim world in the past several decades. U.S. foreign policy in support of 
those autocratic governments contributes to the suppression of vibrant and active forces found 
in professional organizations and other civil society elements that promote dialogue and 
debate on viable democratization initiatives. Unless there is a marked shift in policy to account 
for such dynamics, the Middle East is likely to remain in its current state with a good chance 
of getting worse.  
The key is to empower those forces that battle corruption and advocate for stronger 
institutions that are capable of weathering shifts in governance, bringing about stable, 
representative, and prosperous governments. The goal is not that regional civil society, the 
will of the people, or representative institutions would align with U.S. interests on everything. 
Instead representative governments in a region that has shown a craving for self-determination 
are at a minimum likely to represent the will of their people and eventually lead to an improved 
standard of living, social justice and as a result curb the radicalization effort. Over time stable 
and transparent representative regimes could become contexts where partnership or good-
faith negotiation become real possibilities at a fraction of the resources dedicated to stability 
in the region today. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
Before addressing the resilience of violent Islamist movement U.S. policy makers 
need to find legitimate partners in the region. According to Maghraoui, because U.S. 
credibility within the MENA region is based on the perceived fairness in upholding the liberal 
values it claims to defend, U.S. policy toward the Muslim world should seek alliances with 
those forces that share its liberal values. There are forces in the Muslim world that appreciate 
these values and actively pursue emulating them both regionally and domestically in their 
countries of origin.  
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Policy makers need to pay attention to forces of positive change and better understand 
their capabilities and capacity. Alliances with such legitimate forces that have a history of 
advocating for reform and social justice are likely to alter how U.S. foreign policy is perceived 
and reverse the anti-American sentiment plaguing the region. This is not a solution that is 
likely to bear fruit overnight, but an observed deliberate and consistent policy of empowering 
collective action and social movements, by those moderate forces referenced earlier, in the 
MENA region is likely to alter negative perceptions of U.S. policy intentions. If we had 
learned anything in the MENA region over the past decades, it is that radicalization occurs in 
the shadows where public sentiment is suppressed and political will finds no outlet. 
According to Maghraoui, engaging with such moderate forces, comprised of civil 
society and social movements attempting to direct Islamic revival, is far more natural for the 
United states than it is for “secular Europe, communist China, nationalist Russia, or the 
region’s repressive governments.”145 The United states with its long-standing civil rights 
record and protections for religious moderation is far more poised to align with and support 
burgeoning moderate Islamist movements and their reform focused agendas in the region. 
Those groups’ rejection of violence and their advocacy for equality, justice and accountable 
governance are in concert with the liberal values and rights protected by the U.S. constitution 
and promoted by American social and political institutions. Having a keen understanding of 
those complex dynamics in the Muslim world and formulating a nuanced policy approach that 
embraces “Islam’s ethical appeal” could be a game changer for long term regional policy 
outcomes.146 
Additionally, doubling down on policies that make aid programs contingent on 
transparent governance and vibrant civil society could change the way MENA region 
countries approach governance. Focusing regional U.S. foreign policy purely on security may 
lead to missed opportunities in mending the image of the United States within the region. 
Instead of the perception that U.S. policy makers are actively bolstering the domestic coercive 
apparatus adding to the anti-American sentiment in countries like Egypt and Jordan, they can 
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be seen as supporting plurality and representative democratic governance. Such a shift in 
regional public perceptions is likely to completely change the operating space from one that 
is hostile and suspicious to U.S. policy initiatives to one that is more welcoming. 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS  
Observing the growth and resilience of Jihadi Salafi movements leaves one curious 
how such a puritanical counter-intellectual movement with a high propensity for violence, 
could steal the limelight and dominate intellectual discourse on the challenges within the 
Islamic communities worldwide. Those extreme ideologues existed in the fringes of Arab and 
Muslim societies, lacking in authority and legitimacy and with minimal popular appeal (Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf countries being the exception). The extreme interpretations of Islamic 
doctrine perpetuated by violent Jihadi organizations and the newfound appeal for them have 
to be understood in the context of the extreme conditions that created them. A fringe 
movement without public support is likely to stay in the fringes whereas a fringe movement 
with public support can easily turn into a domestic, and even global, menace.  
According to the research conducted for this thesis, the Political Islam promoted by 
Sunni extremists today gained popularity in response to the poor social, political, and 
economic performance of repressive governments within the MENA region.147 There is a 
reoccurring pattern where Islamists violently pushed out of political participation resorted to 
violence and terrorism in retaliation. Wider conditions, such as poor quality of life and lack 
of social mobility, facilitated violent splinter groups that eventually migrated into the global 
Jihadi camp. These conditions favored Islamists and played right into their false claims of 
fighting for a better world as part of their “ends justify the means” narrative. They widened 
the acceptance for their extreme ideology because of the lack of a viable alternative from 
within the Muslim societies they live in. Under those conditions, moderate voices were 
typically drowned and Jihadi extremists found a more accepting support base.  
Groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda did not simply come from nowhere and could not have 
sustained their operational capabilities without local and global support. Supporters and 
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sympathizers constituted the outer rings for those groups’ survival and persistence. 
Understanding those groups’ appeal and attempting to address the core grievances justifying 
that appeal should be part of the U.S. foreign policy goals to undermine their effectiveness. 
The core elements within those organizations are less likely to be swayed, but chipping at 
their support base by offering a better alternative could be a viable option. In an effort to 
improve its image in the Middle East the United States needs to look closely at resources 
available to help reverse the anti-American sentiment that is prevalent in the region. 
According to Telhami, those resources include “dedicated Muslim and Arab Americans,” 
along with thoughtful, measured, and influential voices in the Arab and Muslim world “who 
have every interest in building bridges between the United States and the nations of the Middle 
East.” 148  
Not all supporters of violent Islamic Jihad are diehard Salafis with a strong affinity to 
the ideology they promote. Most harbor anti-American sentiment due to personal experiences 
and endured hardships from perceived U.S. policies affecting their lives locally. 
Understanding the U.S. policies that contribute to an increased anti-American sentiment is the 
precursor to eliminating the terrorist threat. Eradicating regionally supported terrorism entails 
acknowledging the suffering endured by millions within a targeted region, and directly 
addressing those claiming victimization by perceived U.S. policy overtures.  
At this point a re-evaluation of regional foreign policy is what is needed to reverse 
past trends and address terrorism’s root causes. Only by creating a new foreign policy 
operating space, where anti-American sentiment is diminished, will policy makers 
successfully promote American ideals and set the stage for collaboration with the 
communities of the MENA region. Only after the grievances fueling anti-American sentiment 
are addressed will the U.S. effectively mitigate the radicalization that targets U.S. interests. 
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